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Privacy, security and data protection in smart cities: a critical EU law perspective 
Lilian Edwards1 
I. Introduction 
"Smart cities" are a buzzword of the moment. Although legal interest is growing, most academic 
responses at least in the EU, are still from the technological, urban studies, environmental and 
sociological rather than legal, sectors2 and  have primarily laid emphasis on the social, urban, 
policing and environmental benefits of smart cities, rather than their challenges, in often a rather 
uncritical fashion3 . However a growing backlash from the privacy and surveillance sectors 
warns of the potential threat to personal privacy posed by smart cities4. A key issue is the lack of 
opportunity in an ambient or smart city environment for the giving of meaningful consent to 
processing of personal data; other crucial issues include the degree to which smart cities collect 
private data from inevitable public interactions,  the "privatisation" of  ownership of both 
infrastructure and data,  WKH UHSXUSRVLQJRI ³ELJ GDWD´GUDZQ IURP ,R7 LQ VPDUW FLWLHV and the 
storage of that data in the Cloud. 
This paper, drawing on author engagement with smart city development in Glasgow as well as 
the results of an international conference in the area curated by the author, argues that smart 
cities combine the three greatest current threats to personal privacy, with which regulation has so 
far failed to deal effectively; the Internet of Things(IoT)  or "ubiquitous computing";  "Big Data" 
; and the Cloud. While these three phenomena have been examined extensively in much privacy 
literature (particularly the last two), both in the US and EU, the combination is under-explored. 
Furthermore, US legal literature and solutions (if any) are not simply transferable to the EU 
because of the US's lack of an omnibus data protection (DP) law.  I will discuss how and if EU 
DP law controls possible threats to personal privacy from smart cities and suggest further 
research on two possible solutions: one, a mandatory holistic privacy impact assessment (PIA) 
exercise for smart cities: two, code solutions for flagging the need for, and consequences of, 
giving consent to collection of data in ambient environments. 
The paper falls into five main sections. 
 
                                                          
1 Professor of E-Governance, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. My thanks to Anastasia Gubanova, LLM 
candidate at the University of Strathclyde, for helpful and timely research assistance; and to CREATe and the 
Horizon Digital Economy Hub at Nottingham for helping sponsor the international conference, Designing Smart 
Cities? Opportunities and Regulatory Challenges, Strathclyde, April 2015 from which many insights were drawn 
for this paper. This  research was thus supported by the RCUK funded Centre for Copyright and New Business 
Models in the Creative Economy (CREATe), AHRC Grant Number AH/K000179/1.A full web resource of the 
conference can be found at http://www.create.ac.uk/blog/2014/11/06/designing-smart-cities/ and papers from the 
conference were published as a special edition of the journal of Society for Computers and Law (SCL Journal, vol 
26, issue 2, June 2015/July 2015 (http://www.scl.org/site.aspx?i=is43131 ) some of which are referred to below. My 
thanks also to Lachlan Urquhart (doctoral candidate, Horizon)  who provided  enormously useful research assistance 
for the conference, and editorship for the special edition;  to all the speakers at the conference, whose expertise has 
helped me accelerate up my learning curve about smart cities; and particularly to Francesco Sindico (also of 
Strathclyde) who took charge of the environmental and energy side of the conference. Finally thanks are owed to the 
participants in the Amsterdam Privacy Law Scholars Conference 2015 where this paper was workshopped, 
especially Bert-Jan Koops and Eleni Kosta, and to Daithi MacSithigh for helpful reading and comments. The usual 
disclaimer applies. Links were all checked as valid as of 7 October 2015. 
2 See discusion in Annalisa Cocchia Smart and Digital City: A Systematic Literature Review ( Springer, 2014); also 
overview in the leading text Townsend, A  Smart cities : big data, civic hackers, and the quest for a new utopia 
(W.W.Norton and Co, 2014). 
3 5RE.LWFKLQ¶VProgrammable City project, infra n 60 and Adam Greenfield,infra n 56, are outstanding counter-
examples however 
4 6HHHJ'DYLG0XUDNDPL:RRG¶VVXUYHLOODQFHVWXGLHV8ELFLW\SURMHFWDW4XHHQV2QWDULRLQIUDQ 
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First, I sketch the rise of smart cities globally, both in the West and East and the less developed 
South, and discuss the key technological, economic and political drivers which have made them 
an unstoppable part of the future urban living conditions of  much of the global population. 
Rather than giving one formalistic definition of smart cities which will inevitably be a moving 
target and may not aid legal analysis, I try to sketch their key characteristics, focusing on two 
which are clearly problematic from a privacy frame: first, their dependence on technological 
infrastructures, big data, the IoT and the Cloud; and second , their financing and hence 
³RZQHUVKLS´in almost all cases by public-private partnerships (PPP). 
Second, I lay out the well known vulnerability of smart cities, along with other venues for 
embedded IoT systems, to security threats and how this is approached by the law in the EU. This 
section covers well trodden ground and is therefore relatively short. It should be noted that 
FRQVLGHUDWLRQVRI³SULYDF\´ZUongly so named and limited) in smart cities often stop here. 
Thirdly, I turn to broader issues of  conceptual privacy law frameworks, and lay out what may be 
perceived as a basic underlying theoretical problem, ie,  that smart cities are, in essence, public 
places while traditionally privacy laws such as art 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) and US privacy torts have applied WRSULYDWH³EXEEOHV´RU]RQHV focused on the 
body, the home and private communications. Drawing on ECHR case law as well as attitudinal 
research, I argue reasonable expectations of privacy even in public spaces, as in smart cities, are 
now both recognised by European law and needed by urban dwellers. 
Fourthly, in the most crucial section of the paper, I address in some detail the three key threats to 
privacy and DP  already identified ± the IoT, Big Data and the Cloud - and outline how each 
problem manifests itself to endanger the privacy of  smart city residents and users. In each sub-
section I then try briefly to analyse how, and how well, EU DP law currently deals with 
regulating, preventing or solving these threats.   
This section concludes pessimistically. Despite the many recent rhetorical assertions, politically 
required by the lobbying wars of the draft General DP Regulation (GDPR) and the Silicon 
Valley LGHRORJLFDO WKUXVW WRZDUGV ³SHUPLVVLRQOHVV LQQRYDWLRQ5´  that DP law remains fit for 
purpose in principle, and merely needs tweaked in its detail to address technological challenge, 
in fact, a number of key challenges so far appear relatively insuperable by legal regulation alone. 
Notable amongst these is  the issue of how to obtain meaningful prior consent in Internet of 
Things systems, especially where data is collected in public, as eg in smart road or smart 
transport systems. A second key issue identified is how ordinary users can have any feeling of 
FRQWURORYHUWKHSURFHVVLQJRIWKHLUGDWDZKHQ³ELJGDWD´GULYHVDFRDFKDQGKRUVHVWKURXJKWKH
notion of purpose limitation and data minimisation, and the algorithms used to create inferences 
from it are opaque and capricious to them. Finally I note that in a post Schrems and Snowden 
world, the dependence of smart cities on Cloud infrastructure which may be located anywhere in 
the world also makes them highly dubious from an EU DP point of view. 
Thus, in the fifth section, I turn to some solutions drawn not from law, EXWIURP³FRGH´LQWKH
Lessigian sense, and discussion of Privacy by Design (PbD).  Three particular avenues for 
further promising investigation  are identified: (i) exploring the development of a holistic privacy 
impact assessment (PIA) for smart city data flows; (ii) finding new means for obtaining some 
NLQGRIVWDQGLQJRU³VWLFN\´ consent to data processing decoupled in time from when the data is 
actually pervasively collected via the IoT; (iii) implementing a legal right to algorithmic 
transparency and finding ways of making this knowledge useful to ordinary users.  
In conclusion however, the paper reverts to pessimism with the view that to preserve  privacy in 
VPDUW FLWLHV ZH PD\ QHHG WR PRYH DZD\ IURP WKH OLEHUDO QRWLRQ RI ³QRWLFH DQG FKRLFH´ RU LQ
                                                          
5 Infra, n xx. 
 3 
 
(XURSHDQ WHUPV ³FRQVHQW´ DQG LQIRUPHG specific control over processing, entirely, and look 
LQVWHDG WR DQ ³HQYLURQPHQWDO´ PRGHO RI WR[LF SURFHVVHV ZKLFK VKRXOG EH EDQQHG RU UHVWULFWHG
notwithstanding user permission or substitute grounds for processing. This view, which is only 
tentiavely introduced here, will be justified further in future work. 
II. The Rise of Smart Cities  
 
Increasingly, we live in cities. In the last two decades, urban centres have become the destination 
of choice for citizens and businesses seeking prosperity, stability and social and educational 
facilities, leading  to the progressive abandonment of rural areas and the rising concentration of 
population within metropolitan areas.  2YHUKDOIWKHZRUOG¶VSRSulation already lives in cities: by 
2050, RIWKHZRUOG¶VSRSXlation are expected to live in urban areas, with nearly 90% of that 
increase in Asia and Africa.6 This urbanisation process has become so prominent that in some 
states (eg, South Korea) the capital city generates as much as half of the FRXQWU\¶V*'37 : cities 
are thus sometimes becoming regarded as more important than the countries in which they are 
located8. National governments often now establish ministries for cities (eg, in Brazil, India, 
UK)9 while local city mayors, spearheading city redevelopment and expansion, have acquired 
significant standing and global reputations in cities like London, New York, Barcelona and 
Rio10.  
 
But cities bring with them serious challenges. Globally, high urban density seems inevitably to 
lead to problems including traffic congestion, energy supply and consumption issues, escalation 
of greenhouse gases emissions11, unplanned development, lack of basic services, dramatic 
increase in waste disposal needs, and increases in crime and antisocial behaviour12. The political 
and social need to combat these problems (in particular, the rise of environmental concerns, as 
climate change worries become ever present), combined with the obvious potential for a 
lucrative market for technology and telecommunications companies developing digital and 
networked solutions (e.g. IBM13, Cisco14, Vodafone15), has given rise to the buzzword concept of 
smart cities16.  This idea has been subsequently eagerly leapt on by national and municipal 
                                                          
6 See UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, ³:RUOG 8UEDQLVDWLRQ 3URVSHFWV´. United Nations, New 
York, 2014 revision, p. 1, available at http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/Highlights/WUP2014-Highlights.pdf . 
7 According to Frost and Sullivan, Seoul accounts for DSSUR[LPDWHO\RI WKHFRXQWU\¶V*'3 LQ+XQJDU\DQG
Belgium,  Budapest and Brussels each account for 45%. See Frost and Sullivan, Sense and the City. The application 
of Internet of things technologies for a more sensible city (2014), p, 2, at 
http://www.frost.com/c/481418/sublib/display-market-insight.do?id=291820991 . 
8 See Sarwant Singh, ³6PDUW&LWLHV± $7ULOOLRQ0DUNHW2SSRUWXQLW\´. Forbes / Business (June 20, 2014), at 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/sarwantsingh/2014/06/19/smart-cities-a-1-5-trillion-market-opportunity/ . 
9 See Emily Moir, Tim Moonen and Greg Clark, Essay ³7KHIXWXUHRIFLWLHVZKDWLVWKHJOREDODJHQGD"´ The 
Business of Cities (2014), p. 5, at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/429125/future-cities-global-
agenda.pdf  [last visited September 3, 2015] 
10 Francesco Sindico, paper given at Designing Smart Cities (supra n1). 
11 Cities produce 50% of global waste and account for 60-80% of global greenhouse emissions. See UNEP (United 
Nations Environment Programme), The Global Initiative for Resource Efficient Cities,  at  
http://www.unep.org/resourceefficiency/Policy/ResourceEfficientCities/Activities/GI.REC/tabid/771769/Default.asp
x . 
12 6HH(GZDUG/*ODHVHUDQG%UXFH6DFHUGRWH³:K\,V7KHUH0RUH&ULPHLQ&LWLHV"´ Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 107, no. 6, part 2 (December 1999)  225. 
13 See at http://www.cisco.com/web/strategy/smart_connected_communities.html . 
14 See at http://www-03.ibm.com/innovation/us/thesmartercity/ . 
15 6HHHJ9RGDIRQH¶VRIIHUWROHW\RXGHVLJQ\RXURZQVPDUWFLW\DDJDPHDWhttp://www.designyourqatar.qa/ . 
16 The first study concerning the concept of smart cities is believed to date back to 1994. See, e.g. R.P. Dameri and 
A. Cocchia, ³6PDUW&LW\DQG'LJLWDO&LW\7ZHQW\<HDUVRI7HUPLQRORJ\(YROXWLRQ´. ITAIS ± Italian Conference of 
Information Systems (2013), p. 4, available at  http://www.cersi.it/itais2013/pdf/119.pdf  . The current leading 
academic non-vendor text is perhaps Townsend, supra n X.. 
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political leaders, major global tech corporations, and international institutions and organizations 
alike (e.g. European Commission17, OECD18, ISO19) . Kitchin describes smart cities as an 
attempt to solve the fundamental conundrum of cities ± reducing costs and creating economic 
growth, while at the same time producing sustainability, participation, an acceptable standard of 
civic services and quality of life -  but warns that there are many different conceptions of smart 
cities and that a neo-liberal, market led, technocratic perspective tends to dominate,  as opposed 
to an altHUQDWLYH SDUDGLJP ZKLFK LV WR VHH VPDUW FLWLHV DV ³FLWL]HQ FHQWULF´ IRVWHULQJ VRFLDl 
LQQRYDWLRQ MXVWLFHDQGHQJDJHPHQWLQZKDWKHWHUPVD³VPDUWVRFLHW\´ 20.  Such dominance by 
the pure economic gain perspective may be damaging for consideration of both social needs and 
appropriate legal regulation, something which is beginning to trickle through as a concern in 
European policy circles, despite WKH JHQHUDO ³relentlessly positive21´ GLVFRXUVH DURXQG VPDUW
cities22. 
 
There is currently no VLQJOHDFFHSWHGGHILQLWLRQRID³VPDUWFity´ 23  and much depends on who is 
supplying the characteristics: industry, politicians, civil society and citizens/users are four 
immediately and obviously disparate sets of stakeholders.  It is easier perhaps not to define smart 
cities but to elaborate their key features.  The interlocking key infrastructure that is most often 
PHQWLRQHGDVPDNLQJFLWLHV³VPDUW´includes: 
 
x networks of sensors attached to real world objects such as roads, cars, fridges24, 
electricity meters, domestic appliances and human medical implants  which connect 
these objects to digital networks (WKH ³IQWHUQHW RI 7KLQJV´(IoT)25  ³XELTXLWRXV
FRPSXWLQJ´RUXELFRPSor as Greenfield calls LW³(YHU\ZDUH´26). These IoT networks 
generate data in particularly huge amounts  known colloquially as ³big data´ VHH
below). 
x networks of digital communications enabling real time data streams which can be 
combined with each other and other  and then be mined and repurposed for useful 
results;  
x high capacity , often cloud based, infrastructure which can support and provide storage 
for this interconnection of  data, applications,  things and people. 
                                                          
17 See, e.g. European Commission, ³(XURSH  $ VWUDWHJ\ IRU VPDUW VXVWDLQDEOH DQG LQFOXVLYH JURZWK´, 
COM/2010/2020 FIN adopted 03/03/2010 at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52010DC2020. 
18 See, e.g. OECD, Science, Technology and Industry Outlook 2014, OECD Publishing, at 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/oecd-science-technology-and-industry-outlook-19991428.htm . 
19 See, e.g. ISO (International Organization for Standardization), Smart Cities. Preliminary report 2014, ISO/IEC 
JTC 1 Information technology (2015), at http://www.iso.org/iso/smart_cities_report-jtc1.pdf . 
20 5RE.LWFKLQ³7KH3URPLVHVDQG3HULOVRI6PDUW&LWLHV´LQ6&/VSHFLDOHGLWLRQVXSUDQ   at 
http://www.scl.org/site.aspx?i=ed42789 . 
21 6HH'DYLG0XUDNDPL:RRG³6PDUW&LW\6XUYHLOODQFH&LW\´LQ6&/VSHFLDOHGLWLRQVXSUDQDW
http://www.scl.org/site.aspx?i=ed43113 . 
22 See notably the statement in the recent European Parliament report on Big Data and Smart Devices and their 
Impact on privacy (Study for the LIBE Committee, September 2015) at 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2015/sep/ep-study-big-data.pdf WKDW³WKH(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQSHUVSHFWLYH>RQWKH
Digital Single Market] is very much commercially and economically driven, with little attention paid to the key 
social and legal challenges regarding privacy and daWDSURWHFWLRQ´&RPLQJDVLWGRHVDVDQLQWHUYHQWLRQIURPRQH
EU institution to another as the GDPR goes into trialogue negotiations, this is an extremely barbed statement. 
23. See comparison of terminologies for smart cities  in Cochia, supra n X, pp. 18-19; see also De Santis R., Fasano 
A., Mignoll N., Villa A., ³Smart city: fact and fiction´. Munich Personal RePEc Archive, Paper No. 54536 (March 
15, 2014), pp. 3-6, at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/54536/1/MPRA_paper_54536.pdf  .  
24 The iconic dream of the smart connected fridge has finally entered the mass market via Amazon Dash ± see 
³$PD]RQPDNHVD'DVKWRWDNHOHDGLQWKHLQWHUQHWRIWKLQJV´FT, October 5 2015 at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/721c3c98-6a91-11e5-aca9-d87542bf8673.html#axzz3ntnpveRW . 
25 Discussed and defined in full at pp xx  below. 
26 Adam Greenfield  Everyware: the dawning age of uniquitous computing (2006, New Riders). 
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The claims made for smart cities in their advertising and similar hype vehicles are important both 
in their perception and execution. Smart cities are said WR³interconnect people, data, things, and 
SURFHVVHV XQGHU D G\QDPLF JOREDO LQIUDVWUXFWXUH´ 27. Smart cities then utilise this networked 
infrastructure in order ³to improve economic, resource and political efficiency while enabling 
social, cultural and.. urban development.´28  As Bob Pepper, VP of Global Technology Policy 
for Cisco (a leading smart city vendor) SXWLW³What makes  a city smart is that it recognises the 
centrality of technology and information to improve its processes´29. 
 
Scanning through numerous smart city projects and initiatives currently undertaken, eight key 
activities can be identified that often define a smart city, ie,   
x smart governance,  
x smart infrastructure,  
x smart building,  
x smart connectivity,  
x smart healthcare,  
x smart energy,  
x smart mobility and  
x smart citizens.30   
 
These aspects are often used in comparative studies as indicators describing KRZ³VPDUW´urban 
areas are, for the purpose of ranking cities, often in a funding context.31 For instance, according 
to the 2015 Juniper Research report, Barcelona is currently at the the top of the list RI³VPDUW
FLWLHV´, due to its all-encompassing use of new technologies, including a smart traffic light 
system which sets the lights at green until fire engines have passed, emergency response devices 
LQVWDOOHGLQWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VKRPHDQGFRQQHFWHGWKURXJKDODQGRUPRELOHWHOHSKRQHOLQHWRD
Call Centre, which can be contacted at the simple press of a button, and other innovations32. New 
York City, London, Nice and Singapore33 currently round out the top five.34   This ranking,  has 
become critically important in recent years in driving future city developments  and investments 
by both government and industry35; ³VPDUWQHVV´ has become a competitive index among cities 
for attention, funding and inward investment.  
 
Smart cities are, accordingly,  a global social, economic and political, as well as technological 
phenomenon. In the developed north, cities tend to be ³retrofitted´ or retrospectively 
                                                          
27 See Roberto De Bonis and Enrico Vinciarelli, ³From Smart Metering to Smart City Infrastructure. Could the AMI 
Become the Backbone of the Smart City?´  Smart 2014: The Third International Conference on Smart Systems, 
Devices and Technologies (2014). 
28 United Nations, Bureau International des Expositions, Shanghai 2010 World Exposition Executive Committee. 
Shanghai Manual ± A Guide for Sustainable Urban Development of the 21st Century, Chapter 8 (2010), p. 2. 
29 Quoted in Ellen P Goodman ed The Atomic Age of Data: Policies for the Internet of Things (Report of the 28th 
Annual Aspen Institute Conference on Communications Policy), Washington DC, 2015. 
30 6HHHJ)URVWDQG6XOOLYDQVXSUDQRWHDWSVHHDOVR5XGROI*LIILQJHU+DQV.UDPDU1DWDãD3LFKOHU-
0LODQRYLü Smart City Profiles. Deliverable 2.1. Part 1. PLEEC (May 2014) p. 5, available at 
http://www.pleecproject.eu/downloads/Reports/Work%20Package%202/Smart%20City%20Profiles/pleec_d2_1_sm
art_city_profiles_introduction.pdf  . 
31 See, e.g. Rudolf Giffinger, Gudrun Haindlmaier and Hans Kramar, ³7KH 5ROH RI UDQNLQJ LQ JURZLQJ FLW\
FRPSHWLWLRQ´. Urban Research and Practice (November 25, 2010): vol. 3, issue 3, pp. 299-312  
32 See at http://smartcity.bcn.cat/en . 
33 6HH0HOLVVD/RZ³0DQ\6PDUW&LWLHV2QH6PDUW1DWLRQ± 6LQJDSRUH¶V6PDUW1DWLRQ9LVLRQ´6&/VSHFLDO
edition supra n 1 at http://www.scl.org/site.aspx?i=ed42881 . 
34 See Sam Smith, ³%DUFHORQD QDPHG µ*OREDO 6PDUW &LW\ - ¶´. Juniper Research (February 17, 2015), at 
http://www.juniperresearch.com/press/press-releases/barcelona-named-global-smart-city-2015  . 
35 See Rudolf Giffinger, Gudrun Haindlmaier, ³Smart Cities Ranking: An Effective Instrument for the Positioning 
of Cities?´, ACE: Architecture, City and Environment (February 25, 2010): vol. 4, issue 12, p. 7 . 
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UHFRQVLGHUHGDV³VPDUW´, to meet environmental, social, political or business targets. In the UK, 
smart cities are being actively promoted by the state via LQYHVWPHQW LQ ³smart city 
GHPRQVWUDWRUV´ SODFHG LQ YDULRXV FLWLHV and via agencies such as Innovate UK (formerly 
1(67$ %,6 WKH JRYHUQPHQW PLQLVWU\ IRU WUDGH DQG LQGXVWU\ D VWDWH VSRQVRUHG ³GLJLWDO
FDWDSXOW´ZRUWKP, and a 2015 £40m IoT initiative -   all justified by the hope that the UK 
will become a world leader in this field, able ³to take advantage of up to a $40 billion share of 
the [£400 billion global] market place [for smart cities] E\´36. In 2013, Glasgow, Scotland 
won a £24 million grant as smart city demonstrator, and used the funds, building on some 
existing infrastructure, to develop a series of initiatives, including intelligent street lights that 
brighten when  pedestrians and cyclists are near and dim if there is less activity; a network of 
sensors installed under roads generating data which allows adjustable traffic lights to reduce 
traffic jams; DVWDWHRIWKHDUW³VPDUW&&79´FRQWUROFHQWUH; DQGD³GDWDUHSRVLWRU\´RIRSHQFLYLF
data which can be exploited by academic researchers.37  As a result it was claimed that 
³international acclaim´ FDPH LQ WKH IRUP RI D *HRVSDWLDO :RUOG ([FHOOHQFH $ZDUG ³for 
providing leadership in demonstrating how older, more established cities can be transformed 
LQWR 6PDUW &LWLHV RI WKH IXWXUH´.38 Smart cities are thus not just a matter of producing less 
polluted or more efficient cities, but generate considerable political capital and big business 
opportunities along with a large potential export market39.   
 
In the developing world, smart cities are equally politicised but often play a different role, of 
enabling modernisation and development, responding to problems arising from population 
pressure, climate change, migration and rural to urban transition. Non-Western smart cities are 
often created from scratch ³WRSGRZQ´rather than retrofitted40. India for example has vowed to 
create 100 new smart cities , allocating £760m to the project41. Most such developments  are 
inspired by WKH ³JOREDO HDVW´ HJ -DSDQ 6LQJDSRUH .RUHD  $IULFD LV DV \HW QRW UHDOO\ RQ WKH
smart cities map, though there are developments in, eg, South Africa42. Developing countries 
smart cities attract a different set of criticisms, that they are vehicles for creating gated smart 
enclaves of privilege, in a sea of millions of technology-deprived poor, are often established by 
compulsory and controversial land acquisition policies43. 
 
Smart city funding is significant. Historically, particularly in Europe, financial support from the  
cash-stricken post-recession public sector, at either national or municipal level, has not generally 
been sufficient to finance the radical technological deployments involved. Instead financing 
                                                          
36 See BIS press release, 18 December 2013, at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-set-to-lead-the-way-for-
smart-cities . 
37 See Hamish Camdonell, ³*ODVJRZ WKH PDNLQJ RI D VPDUW FLW\´. The Guardian (April 21, 2015), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/public-leaders-network/2015/apr/21/glasgow-the-making-of-a-smart-city . See further 
at http://futurecity.glasgow.gov.uk/ . 
38 See James Perkins, ³)XWXUH&LW\*ODVJRZSURMHFWUHFRJQL]HGZLWKWZRDZDUGV´. Digital by Default News (July 2, 
2015), available at http://www.digitalbydefaultnews.co.uk/2015/07/02/future-city-glasgow-project-recognised-with-
two-awards/  . 
39 Within the academic economy, smart cities are also seen as a tempting opportunity to attract funding and kudos: 
major centres of research have been established (to name a few) at Fordham University (US), University College 
London (UK), Strathclyde Future Cities Unit (Scotland) and the Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (Spain). 
40 $QH[FHSWLRQLV6WHOOHQERVFKLQ6RXWK$IULFDZKLFKDVSLUHVWREHD³VPDUWWRZQ´HQDEOHGE\SUR[LPLW\WRPDMRU
universities: see n 39 infra. 
41 See http://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/may/07/india-100-smart-cities-project-social-apartheid ³,QGLDLV
going to see a huge urbanisation, the latest McKinsey study says by the year 2030 we will have 350 million [more] 
Indians getting into the process of urbanisation, by 2050, 700 million". 
42 See http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2013/nov/21/smart-cities-relevant-
developing-world . 
43 See the furore round the Indian Land Acquisition Act 2013 as amended : eg see https://in.news.yahoo.com/the-
questions-we-should-be-asking-frequently-about-the-land-acquisition-act-060820434.html . 
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tends to be by Public-Private Partnership (PPP) 44, which can be defined  DV³agreements between 
a public agency (federal, state or local) and a private-sector entity that uses the specific skills 
and assets of each sector for the delivery of a service for the general public.´45 A vaunted 
successful example of PPP funding is the Intelligence Operations Center in Rio de Janeiro which 
was built by IBM in preparation for the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympic Games.46 Rio was 
regarded as one of the most dangerous cities on earth and there was felt to be a need to somehow 
reassure the influx of global visitors expected for the Olympics and World Cup. Hundreds of 
cameras and countless other sensors and devices placed throughout the city live-stream data onto 
a giant video wall of the Center for 24/7 monitoring, allowing city operators to immediately 
respond to crime, accidents, power outages, torrential storms and other occurrences. The 
&HQWUH¶V FLW\ZLGH V\VWHP, integrating data from some 30 agencies, was described by Anne 
$OWPDQ JHQHUDO PDQDJHU IRU ,%0¶V *OREDO 3XEOLF 6HFWRU DV DQ Dll±seeing eye that can 
³accurately gather, analyse, and act on information about city systems and services´ DQG
³recognizes the behaviour of the city as a whole´47   
 
Such an example raises pointedly the question of who (if anyone) owns the data that smart cities 
produce and process in such vast amounts. Policing, surveillance, crowd control, emergency 
response,  are all historically state functions, and citizens might expect the very sensitive data 
involved  to be held by the state. Yet the likelihood in a PPP built city is that that data finds itself 
(at least partially or non exclusively48) in private control.  Balabanovic and Galwas, who work at 
WKHFHQWUHRIWKH8.VPDUWFLWLHVLQGXVWU\QRQFKDODQWO\PHQWLRQWKDW³City governments assume 
they will controOVPDUWFLW\VHUYLFHVEXWZHSUHGLFWWKH(&>³(QYLURQPHQW-to-&LWL]HQ´@PDUNHW
will inevitably be dominated by global consumer services´DQGFLWHWKHGRPLQDQFHover public 
sector offerings of existing private sector consumer applications in sectors such as maps, taxis, 
transport planning and fitness tracking; and the tendency of these markets to winner-takes-all 
network effects49.   
 
The lack of universal open or proprietary standards for exchange of data is another key issue 
driving data into private silos. The EU is attempting to mitigate this with  by funding attempts to 
build interoperable protocols for private tech suppliers operating in smart cities, particularly in 
fields like energy and, generally, IoT systems50.  Open data is often mentioned as  a key matter 
for citizen engagement in smart cities eg the Glasgow data repository noted above is open to 
researchers; Rio also made a data portal open to the public with key datasets51. But as  a worst 
case, a smart city may become the private data fiefdom of a monopoly technology or telecoms 
                                                          
44 See Smart Cities Council, Smart cities Financing Guide (August 24, 2015), at 
http://smartcitiescouncil.com/resources/smart-cities-financing-guide  and  Smart Cities Stakeholder Platform, 
Financing models for smart cities, version 2.0 (November 2013), at https://eu-smartcities.eu/sites/all/files/Guideline-
%20Financing%20Models%20for%20smart%20cities-january.pdf . 
45  Smart Cities Council (2015), supra, at  48. 
46 See BIS Research Paper No. 135, Global Innovators: International Case Studies on Smart Cities. ARUP, London, 
UK (October 2013), pp. 13-17, at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/249397/bis-13-1216-global-
innovators-international-smart-cities.pdf . 
47 ³,QWHOOLJHQFH &LWLHV )RUXP $QQH $OWPDQ´, National Building Museum (June 6, 2011), at 
http://www.nbm.org/media/video/intelligent-cities/forum/intelligent-cities-forum-altman.html . See also discussion 
in section 3 of BIS Research paper No 135 Global innovators: International Case Studies on Smart Cities, supra n 
44. 
48 Rio claimed they received about 35% oIPXQLFLSDO³VPDUW´VSHQGLQJIURPSULYDWHFRPSDQLHVVHH%,6SDSHU
supra n 44). 
49 6HH0DUFR%DODEDQRYLFDQG3DXO*DOZDV³:KRVH6PDUW&LW\LVLW$Q\ZD\"´LQ6&/VSHFLDOHGLWLRQVXSUDQDW
http://www.scl.org/site.aspx?i=ed42880 .. 
50 See eg http://ercim-news.ercim.eu/en98/special/moving-towards-interoperable-internet-of-things-deployments-in-
smart-cities . 
51 BIS paper, supra n 44, at 3.3.2. 
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provider. Sadowski, an Arizona University researcher on the future of cities,  suggests that a 
SDUDGLJP H[DPSOH RI D ³WRS-GRZQ´ VPDUW FLW\ 6RQJGR LQ 6RXWK .RUHD ³is as much Cisco 
Systems city as it is South .RUHD¶VEHFDXVHWKH\KDYHPRVWRIWKHFRQWUDFWVIRUWKHKDUGZDUHDQG
VRIWZDUH WKDW SRZHU LW´52. In the EU these questions form a part of ongoing worries and 
XQFHUWDLQWLHVDERXWZKRRZQVDQGKRZWRFRQWURO³ELJGDWD´53, and suppliers too are sensitised to 
the issue as problematic for both cities and citizens: for example, one industry speaker allowing 
WKDW³what we do with the information we collect and who owns it are the key questions facing 
smart cities54´ 
 
Accordingly at this stage this paper echoes, but with perhaps more concern, the conclusion of 
Goodman55, who emphasises that conceptions of smart cities all share two features: ³They 
emphasise public-private partnerships and place information and communications technologies 
,&7DW WKHFRUHRI VPDUWFLW\RSHUDWLRQ´. Expanding on the latter part, smart cities, we have 
seen,  are crucially dependent on three sets of technological phenomenon: the IoT; big data; and 
the Cloud. As will be discussed further below, serious privacy regulatory problems are 
associated with all three features, and smart cities, as the unholy union of all three, represent an 
LQWHUHVWLQJ³XVHFDVH´IRUSULYDF\VFKRODUV Finally, I have established that political and economic 
drivers for smart cities will not easily be derailed by quibbles about privacy and fundamental 
rights, and that academic literature has a role here to intercede for the public interest between 
political objectives and industry gain56. 
 
It would be remiss not to say in this introductory section, as may already be apparent from some 
of the above, that smart cities are also quite easy to dismiss as a creation of the much-noted 
WHFKQRORJ\ ³K\SH F\FOH´57 which also brought us the dot.com bubble, ³:HE  ´ and many 
other technowaves of enthusiasm. On this well known scale, smart cities may well be at the top 
RI WKH ³SHDN RI LQIODWHG H[SHFWDWLRQV´ MXVW EHIRUH WKH ³WURXJK RI GLVLOOXVLRQPHQW´ Goodman 
WDFWIXOO\VXJJHVWVWKDW³the literature on smart cities can be decidedly utopian´58. However given 
the volume of national pride, money and infrastructure that is being pumped into the smart cities 
paradigm, alongside what is generally cursory legal analysis if any, this writer maintains the 
phenomenon is worth examining further. 
 
A second awkward question which should be raised, is why discuss privacy and smart cities? 
Why not privacy and the IoT, or privacy and big data, or even privacy and the collapse of the 
private/public spaces demarcation? Each of these now has a steadily growing literature. There 
are a number of answers to this.  First, smart cities represent the synthesis of all of these 
                                                          
52 ³,QWHUYLHZ-RQDWKDQ6DGRZVNLRQWKH)XWXUHRI&LWLHV´Hieroglyph, October 14 2014. 
53 See inter alia, EU EDPS  Opinion on privacy and competitiveness in the age of big data 26 March 2014; 
ICO (UK) Big data and data protection  July 2014; Article 29 EU Data Protection Working Party Statement  on Big 
data , September 2014, 14/EN WP 221; Big Data and Smart Devices and Their Impact on our Privacy, supra n XX.. 
54 Vinnett Taylor, KHDGRI00TXRWHGLQ(PPD:ULJKWDQG'LDQQH'HYOLQ³6PDUW&LWLHV± Power to the 
&LWL]HQV"´Computers and Law, 16 April 2015 , now available online at 
http://www.bonddickinson.com/insights/publications-and-briefings/smart-cities-power-citizens .  
55 Supra n 27, at pp 43ff. 
56 Not all academic literature of course sees smart cities and the IoT as problematic for privacy, at least not in the 
same ways DVWKLVDUWLFOHGRHV6HHHJ0F.D\&XQQLQJKDP³1H[W*HQHUDWLRQ3ULYDF\7KH,QWHUQHWRI7KLQJV'DWD
([KDXVWDQG5HIRUPLQJ5HJXODWLRQE\5LVNRI+DUP´*URQLQJHQ-RXUQDORI,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ9RO(G
who sees the IoT and smart cities as use cases indicating the need for reform of data protection law  as an over 
LQFOXVLYHDQGXQJUDGXDWHGIDLOXUH*LODG5RVQHU³1RWKH,R7GRHVQRWQHHGVWURQJSULYDF\DQGVHFXULW\WRIORXULVK´
2¶5HLOO\UHSRUW6HSWHPEHUVXPPDU\DW5DGDU6HSWHPEHU5 at http://radar.oreilly.com/2015/09/no-
the-iot-does-not-need-strong-privacy-and-security-to-flourish.html . 
57 See http://www.gartner.com/technology/research/methodologies/hype-cycle.jsp . 
58 6XSUDQDW$OWKRXJKLW³DOVRKDVDG\VWRSLDQWKUHDG´LQLWVQDUUDWLYHVRIVXUYHLOODQFHDQGVHFXULW\
vulnerability. See further below and Murakami Wood supra n 19. A notable early opponent of the smart mythos 
from a sociological perspective is Adam Greenfield: see Against Smart Cities ( 2013, Amazon Kindle publisher). 
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problems. In this sense they are a unique and important use case, which deserves special, 
bespoke attention. Second, as I have tried to demonstrate above, smart cities are important. In the 
IXWXUHWKHPDMRULW\RIXVZLOOEHOLYLQJLQFLWLHVDQGSHUKDSVPDQ\RIXVLQ³VPDUW´RUDWOHDVW, 
not dumb, cities59.  Investment in smart cities is only going to increase ± as I wrote this paper, 
Obama pledged to spend a further $160m on smart cities60 ± and whatever terminology is used, 
data driven connected urbanism is not going away61.  
 
Thirdly, in each of the privacy literatures mentioned above, US literature tends to determine how 
the world sees these issues. US literature ± including academic papers, conferences and industry 
and quango-funded reports - is in a better position to dominate the literature mainly because it is 
generally larger and better funded than its European equivalent, but also because US industry has 
in general been been ahead of Europe in understanding how quasi-academic discourse can help 
support the claims of more obvious outright lobbying. Yet the yawning cavern between EU and 
US conceptions of privacy, and their different approaches to how to legally regulate such (or 
whether to at all), especially in hot button areas such as big data, ubiquitous computing and 
private/commercial versus public interests, has been the privacy story of the millennium so far. 
A literature is needed which examines smart cities and privacy in terms of the EU social context 
and the mandatory rules of EU law, however vague, conflicted and about to be reformed (for the 
last three years and counting) they are. Arguably, a pragmatic and multidisciplinary  academic 
literature is also needed which can mediate between the precise and legally impeccable but 
sometimes over-perfect interpretations of the A29 Working Party (A29 WP), and the commercial 
realities of a Europe in recession, and seeking commercial social solutions which involve 
inevitable compromise with private sector, globally based vendors.  
 
Finally, we need to discuss privacy and smart cities now, not at some indeterminate time later 
when we have worked through all the building-block categories of privacy problems involved. In 
the solutions section of this paper, it becomes apparent that perhaps the best way forward is 
privacy by design (PbD) : WKH LGHD RI EXLOGLQJ SULYDF\ LQWR WKH ³FRGH´ ie,  the architecture 
(within cities, in its real, materials sense, not merely using the term as Lessig does62 as a 
metaphor for hardware and software). If we are building smart cities now, then we need to work 
out what PbD can do for society before, or at least, as, we design and build them. 
 
III Smart Cities:  Security and Privacy 
 
Smart cities are not a panacea for all ills, and they bring their own problems. Some, as already 
noted, revolve around practical issues such as funding, capacity, access to relevant technologies, 
interoperability of data, technical standardisation, etc. Others are political: buy-in by the national 
and local politicians, the energy companies, and the citizens themselves  ± a recent NESTA 
report, surveying numerous cities,  points that many smart citLHV³have failed to deliver on their 
                                                          
59 Or in smart towns or even villages: see %UDQND'LPLWULMHYLF³)URP7UDQVLWLRQ7RZQVWR6PDUW&LWLHV
2SSRUWXQLWLHVDQG&KDOOHQJHV´LQ6&/VSHFLDOHGLWLRQVXSUDQDWhttp://www.scl.org/site.aspx?i=ed43114 , citing 
Linlithgow, between *ODVJRZDQG(GLQEXUJKDVDWRZQXWLOLVLQJ³ELJGDWD´IRUGHFLVLRQPDNLQJDQGVRFLDO
innovation. 
60 See https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/14/fact-sheet-administration-announces-new-smart-
cities-initiative-help , September 14, 2015. See on EU funding of smart cities, both directly and via research 
SURJUDPPHVVXFKDV)37+$:LVPDQ³3XUSRVHDQGIXQFWLRQ creep by design: Transforming the face of 
VXUYHLOODQFHWKURXJKWKH,QWHUQHWRI7KLQJV´(XURSHDQ-RXUQDORI7HFKQRORJ\9RO1RDW6HHDOVR
Telegraph³:KRZLOOSD\IRUWKH,QWHUQHWRI7KLQJV"´-DQXDU\DW
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/internet/11377083/Who-will-pay-for-the-Internet-of-Things.html . 
61 See Kitchin, supra n 18. 
62 Lawrence Lessig Code 2.0 (Basic Books, 2006). See also Rob Kitchin, ³From a Single Line of Code to an Entire 
City: Reframing Thinking on Code and the City´3URJUDPPDEOH&LW\WP No 4, Nov 2014, downloadable at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2520435 . 
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SURPLVH GHOLYHULQJ KLJK FRVWV DQG ORZ UHWXUQV µ6PDUW FLWLHV¶ RIIHU VHQVRUV µELJ GDWD¶ DQG
advanced computing as answers to these challenges, but they have often faced criticism for being 
too concerned with hardware rather than with people63´  
 
Two further issues are particularly germane to this paper situated as it is in law: security, by 
which I mean the susceptibility of data to either accidental or deliberate breaches as a result of 
technical or organisational failures; and privacy, in which I include the European data protection 
(DP) sense of the right of individuals to control the collection and processing, including further 
re-uses, of their personal data. Privacy is also strongly governed in Europe by art 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights which acts as a benchmark against which both EU DP 
rules and nation state laws can be judged. 
 
Security and vulnerabilities 
 
Cities and their infrastructure are already the most complex structures ever created by men, and 
interweaving them with equally complex smart cities solutions, reliant on wireless sensor 
networks and integrated communications systems, makes them extremely vulnerable to power 
failure, software errors and cyber-attacks.64 Even a simple bug can have a huge impact on urban 
infrastructure.65  
 
The insecurity and vulnerability of smart city systems is a commonly acknowledged 
phenomenon66, which echoes, and largely derives from, the well known lack of security and 
trustworthiness of the IoT in general. The FTC in its influential 2015 report on the IoT, notes 
security risks as its greatest worry, both in terms of vulnerability of IoT devices themselves, 
leading to their compromise or failure, and their potential use to spread vulnerabilities through 
QHWZRUNVDQGWRRWKHUV\VWHPVWKH³]RPELH´SUREOHP67.  For example, potentially, your smart, 
Internet-connected, fridge might be hijacked to send spam68. The FTC has already taken its first 
enforcement action against a vulnerable consumer IoT implementation: a company making baby 
monitors attached to the Internet, thus allowing parents to view live feeds of their infants from a 
distance, had its feeds ³KDFNHG´ LQ QHDUO\  FDVHV69. &RQQHFWHG FDUV RU ³DXWRQRPRXV
YHKLFOHV´ DUH DQRWher significant IoT use case where vulnerability to outsider hacking has 
already been demonstrated: eg, Wired reported in June 2015 how Jeep Cherokees could reliably 
EH ³KLMDFNHG´ E\ H[WHUQDO KDFNHUV ZKLOH RQ WKH URDG70. Brown, in a 2015 report for the ITU,  
QRWHVWKDW³electronic attacks can.. lead to threats to physical safety´FLWLQJSRVVLEOHWDUJHWVVXFK
                                                          
63 See further  NESTA Rethinking Smart Cities From The Ground Up, June 2015,  
http://www.nesta.org.uk/publications/rethinking-smart-cities-ground#sthash.398wQeB1.dpuf . 
64 See A Townsend, ³6PDUW&LWLHV´. Places Journal (October 2013) at https://placesjournal.org/article/smart-cities/  . 
65 See eg the San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transport bug of November 2013, in Cesar Cerrudo, ³$Q(PHUJLQJ86
DQG:RUOG7KUHDW&LWLHV:LGH2SHQWR&\EHU$WWDFNV´, White Paper, IOActive, Inc. (2015), p. 10  at 
http://www.ioactive.com/pdfs/IOActive_HackingCitiesPaper_CesarCerrudo.pdf . 
66 See inter alia Townsend, supra n 14; Goodman, n 27. 
67 See FTC Staff report Internet of Things: Privacy and Security in a Connected World, January 2015 at 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-staff-report-november-2013-
workshop-entitled-internet-things-privacy/150127iotrpt.pdf  (herafter FTC, 215). 
68 6HH3DXO7KRPDV³'HVSLWHWKHQHZV\RXUUHIULGJHUDWRULVQRW\HWVHQGLQJVSDP´6\PDQWHF-DQDW
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/despite-news-your-refrigerator-not-yet-sending-spam . 
69 Supra no 65,  p 13, n 52 and https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/09/marketer-internet-
connected-home-security-video-cameras-settles . 
70 See http://www.wired.com/2015/07/hackers-remotely-kill-jeep-highway/ . Another area of considerable worry is 
hacking of medical devices,  both external (eg connected MRI machines ± VHH%%&1HZV³Medical devices 
YXOQHUDEOHWRKDFNHUV´6HSWHPEHUDWhttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-34390165 ) and implanted in 
human bodies (eg pacemakers, as famously shown in an episode of Homeland.) Even automated carwashers have 
WKHLUZRUULHVVHH³+DFNLQJDWWKHFDUZDVK\HK´)HEUXDU\DWDW
http://www.darkreading.com/vulnerabilities---threats/hackin-at-the-car-wash-yeah/d/d-id/1319156 . 
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as medical pacemakers, insulin pumps and car brakes, and noting the possibilities for burglars to 
VSRW ³VPDUW PHWHUHG´ SUHPLVHV DV FXUUHQWO\ XQRFFXSLHG71. These worries only expand as the 
number of connected smart objects grows. Cisco eg  predict that there will be 50 billion devices 
connected to the Internet by 2020. 72. 
 
Why is the IoT so insecure? IoT devices, being, usually, small, very cheap, without independent 
power source and churned out in their millions, and historically for industrial not consumer use, 
are routinely designed with poor encryption strength and  a lack of other security features73. The 
IoT heavily relies on wireless communications protocols or APIs that, due to the lack of 
PDQGDWRU\ WHFKQLFDO DQG VHFXULW\ VWDQGDUGV DUH XVXDOO\ ³only secured as an afterthought, or 
worse, not secured at all, transmitting data in the clear´74  The FTC report on IoT notes that 
companies making IoT devices may not have experience in dealing with security issues; that 
they have often been conceived as disposable; that patching of vulnerabilities may not have been 
envisaged or be possible to add; and that consumers in general have little or no idea about IoT 
security75. As a result default passwords are often installed in household appliances, never 
changed and routinely compromised: eg one website claimed that 73,000 webcams had been 
installed and were accessible over the Internet using a single, default, known password76. 
 
For smart cities, these problems carry over and will be multiplied by the complexities involved 
in multiple vendors and interoperating systems; and the effects may be far more devastating. 
Cerrudo asserts that most cities are implementing new technologies with little or no cyber 
security testing, meaning that, eg, traffic control sensors installed in Washington DC, New York, 
London, Lyon and other cities can be easily attacked with a simple exploit programmed on cheap 
hardware.77 Brown adds that smart city vulnerabilities will be particularly hard to address given 
links to older public and private sector systems. Vulnerabilities in embedded architectures cannot 
be as simply patched digitally as conventional software, leading to a possible future of the 
³,QWHUQHWRI-XQN´78. In short, smart cities are a security disaster waiting to happen. 
 
Solutions 
 
The application of DP law, including the PECD, to the security of the IoT is discussed in detail 
below (section V(i)) as part of its general privacy problem set. A particular solution to the 
security issue, which has already been partly implemented, is to mandate security breach 
                                                          
71 See Ian Brown GSR discussion paper Regulation and the Internet of Things (ITU, 2015 ) (draft issued for 
discussion) at http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-
D/Conferences/GSR/Documents/GSR2015/Discussion_papers_and_Presentations/GSR_DiscussionPaper_IoT.pdf . 
72 See Dave Evans, White Paper ³7KH ,QWHUQHW RI 7KLQJV +RZ WKH 1H[W (YROXWLRQ RI WKH ,QWHUQHW LV &KDQJLQJ
(YHU\WKLQJ´. Cisco white paper (2011), p. 3, at 
http://www.iotsworldcongress.com/documents/4643185/0/IoT_IBSG_0411FINAL+Cisco.pdf . 
73 According to the HP Fortify report, 70% of most commonly used IoT devices contain security vulnerabilities, 
including password security, encryption and general lack of granular user access permissions. See HP Fortify, 
Report Internet of Things Research Study (2014), p. 5, at 
http://h20195.www2.hp.com/V2/GetDocument.aspx?docname=4AA5-4759ENW&cc=us&lc=en . 
74 $NDPDL DNDPDL¶V >VWDWH RI WKH LQWHUQHW@ UHSRUW  S  at 
https://www.antel.com.uy/wps/wcm/connect/2e38bd0047ad6c9682d3e7af6890d810/q3-2014-state-of-the-internet-
report+(2).pdf?MOD=AJPERES   . 
75 Supra n 65 at p 13. 
76 6HH.HYLQ7RIHO³*RWDQ,3ZHEFDP"+HUHDUHUHDVRQVWRFKDQJHWKHSDVVZRUG´*LJD2P5HVHDUFK
November 2014 at https://gigaom.com/2014/11/07/got-an-ip-webcam-here-are-73000-reasons-to-change-from-the-
default-password/ . 
77 See Cesar Cerrudo, ³+DFNLQJ86DQG8.$XVWUDOLD)UDQFHHWF7UDIILF&RQWURO6\VWHPV´. IOActive (April 30, 
2014), available at http://blog.ioactive.com/2014/04/hacking-us-and-uk-australia-france-etc.html . 
78 The term seems to originate from security researcher Tod Beardsley. See http://panelpicker.sxsw.com/vote/54858. 
0RUHSROLWHO\7RZQVHQGSUHGLFWVWKDWVPDUWFLWLHVPD\EH³EXJJ\EULWWOHDQGEXJJHG´VHH7RZQVHQGVXSUDQ
ch 9. 
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disclosure. Currently this only applies to telecoms providers under art 4(2) of the Privacy and 
Electronic Communications Directive (PECD)79 but will probably be extended to all data 
controllers by the GDPR 80 when and if it passes and is transposed. Data breaches of a certain 
level of severity will have to be reported to privacy regulators, although data controllers may 
have a defense if they have adopted adequate security measures.81  
 
An obvious problem is the lack of global harmonisation on security legal standards, in a  world 
of global procurement. The Budapest Cybercrime Convention provides a bare minimum of 
international harmonisation on security regulation but is principally aimed at enabling global law 
enforcement in criminal matters, not at promoting higher security standards for industry. It does 
not mandate civil liability (though art 13 allows for such to exist). It would be interesting, though 
outwith the scope of this article, to investigate if the various provisions being mooted to protect 
critical infrastructure from cyberwar attacks and cyber insecurity (see eg the  2008 Directive on 
European Critical Infrastructures 2008/114/EC and the proposed  Directive 2013/0027) might 
extend to smart cities. 
 
³6RIWODZ´rather than hard law regulation of  IoT security has been in the ascendance in the EU 
since 2013 or earlier.82  Notably, a specialised but non mandatory PIA  procedure for RFID chip 
installations (essentially an early subset of the IoT) was developed by Spiekerman and her team 
through consultation with relevant industries and policymakers83. This forms part of a general 
regulatory trend towards encouraging a proactive rather than retrospective approach to security 
risks with privacy by design (PbD)84 principles. This approach was promoted in the Mauritius 
Declaration on the Internet of Things in October 2014 and by the FTC in their IoT report.85 In 
Europe, a PbD requirement, alongside  requirements for data protection impact assesments 
(DPIAs86) is expected to be included in the GDPR.  $OORIWKHVH³FRGH´VROXWLRQVare discussed 
in more detail below in section VI.  
 
A final key extralegal may be found  in future in an adequate global cybersecurity insurance 
market87. This is something which has stalled to date, and is still emergent,  but which may be 
kickstarted by a global move to mandatory security breach notification. 
 
                                                          
79 2002/58/EC. 
80 See European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data 
(hereafter, General Data Protection Regulation or GDPR), COM(2012) 11 final, 2012/0011 (COD). January 25, 
2012. The GDPR is expected to be passed by end 2015 and thereafter will probably have a two year transition 
period for member states to implement its demands. 
81 See Ricardo Tavares, ³5LVHRIWKHPDFKLQHV´Intermedia 28.  
82  A 2013 EU Commission consultation on IoT regulation found a diversity of views on whether IoT specific 
regulation was necessary (see http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/news/conclusions-internet-things-public-
consultation ). See further H.R. Schindler et al, ³(XURSH¶V SROLF\ options for a dynamic and trustworthy 
GHYHORSPHQW RI WKH ,QWHUQHW RI 7KLQJV´ (SMART 2012/0053), prepared for the European Commission, DG 
Communications Networks, Content and Technology (CONNECT), Brussels (31 May 2013),  at 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR356.html  
83 6HH6DUDK6SLHNHUPDQ³7KH5),'3,$± 'HYHORSHGE\,QGXVWU\$JUHHGE\5HJXODWRUV´LQ'DYLG:ULJKWDQG
Paul de Hert eds Privacy Impact Assessment : Engaging Stakeholders in protecting Privacy (Springer, 2011), 
discussed further infra p XX. 
84 See further below, p XX ±XX. 
85 See 36th International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners, 14 October 2014 at  
http://www.privacyconference2014.org/media/16596/Mauritius-Declaration.pdf ; FTC, supra n 65. 
86 See p xx below 
87 See World Economic Forum (2014), at p. 33. Price Waterhouse Cooper argue the change to mandatory security 
EUHDFKQRWLILFDWLRQ ³PD\ ZHOO EH WKH FDWDO\VW WR FKDQJH WKH F\EHU OLDELOLW\ LQVXUDQFH ODQGVFDSH LQ WKH8.´  VHH
Information Security Breaches Survey, HM Government (2015), p. 29, at http://www.pwc.co.uk/assets/pdf/2015-
ISBS-Technical-Report-blue-digital.pdf  .) 
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IV Privacy 
 
The new PPP : Private-public-places. 
 
Conceptually, privacy in smart cities is an interesting conundrum.  Historically, we have tended 
to protect  a ]RQHRU³EXEEOH´RISULYDF\ZKLFKEHJLQVZLWKRXUERGLHVHPEUDFHVRXUKRPHVDQG
then extends to private communications we send out into the world. This is seen in the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) where art 8 famously demands respect for our ³private 
DQG IDPLO\ OLIHKRPHDQGFRUUHVSRQGHQFH´  By contrast, cities seem quintessentially a public 
space, where expectations of privacy (except by obscurity) have historically been low to zero. 
But as MacSithigh has cogently noted, in the information society many virtual spaces controlled 
by private interests have acquire a quasi-public character akin to town squares or public libraries, 
places where historically rights of speech, access to knowledge or assembly were traditionally 
exercised : notably online communities and search engines88. IQ ³VPDUW FLWLHV´, the reverse 
paradigm operates: what was historically public such as the town squares, the roads, the mass 
transit, the health and policing systems, is very likely now to be privately operated or at least full 
of privately operated sensors with the data collected held in private databases.  These parts of 
cities have now become what might be called ³SULYDWH-public-SODFHV´ (or transmuting 
0DF6LWKLJK³SVHXGR-SULYDWH´SODFHV.) 
 
The growth of the information society and especially ubiquitous computing has already 
recognizably undermined this conception of privacy as relating to a spatially delimited  
³EXEEOH´89. Koops  has more recently robustly deconstructed  this notion of  natural essentialist 
³ERXQGDULHVRISULYDWHVSDFHV´DUJXLQJWKDW³place is no longer a useful proxy to delineate the 
boundaries of the private sphere´+HSRLQWVRXW WKDWQRZDGD\Vpersonal data that would have 
once have stayed safely at home,  is now carried around or stored without much, if any, thought 
outside the home : on smartphones or other portable devices; on webmail servers; or in the cloud 
generally. Furthermore data that would have been opaquely safe at home is now often 
transparent to the world: for example, homes equipped with smart meters reveal finely grained 
detail of energy consumption and powered applications, and can have their occupancy and 
activities minutely observed from without90. Heat sensors, directional microphones and tiny 
surveillance drones can also breach the domestic wall. Finally, even in public spaces, where once 
SHRSOHUHOLHGRQ³SUDFWLFDOREVFXULW\´IRUSULYDF\SURWHFWLRQhence, arguably, not needing legal 
protection), the prevalence of  surveillance via inter alia smart CCTV systems, ANPR (number 
plate) recognition, GPS and wi fi network tracking and cheap, reliable facial recognition 
software means that obscurity-in-public is pretty much at an end. Given this combination of 
³HYDSRUDWLQJ KRPHV´ DQG ³XELTXLWRXV WUDFNDELOLW\´ .oops argues we have moved towards an 
DJHRI³¶XELTXLWRXVGDWD¶LQZKLFKSULYDWHSODce distinctions lose relevance. In smart cities, like 
the bar in Cheers, everyone knows your name. 
 
How should we approach privacy regulation in such a domain? If your personal data is easily 
accessible in WKH³SXEOLF´DUHDVRIa smart city,  then should the same privacy protections apply 
as in a private dwelling? If you travel on a smart road or a smart connected public transport 
                                                          
88 6HH'DLWKL0DF6LWKLJK³9LUWXDOZDOOV"7KHODZRISVHXGR-SXEOLFVSDFHV´,QWHUQDWLRQDO-RXUQDORI/DZ
in Context 394. 
89 6HH&ROLQ%HQQHWW³,Q'HIHQVHRI3ULYDF\´6XUYHLOODQFHDQG6RFLHW\ 
90 See Bert--DQ.RRSV³2Q/HJDO%RXQGDULHV7HFKQRORJLHVDQG&ROODSVLQJ'LPHQVLRQVRI3ULYDF\´Politica e 
Società 3(2), p. 247-6HHDOVR,DQ%URZQ³%ULWDLQ¶V6PDUW0HWHU3URJUDPPHDFDVHVWXG\LQSULYDF\E\
GHVLJQ´,QW5HY/&7RQWKHQXPEHURIWKLQJVDQRXWVLGHUFDQILQGRXWIURPDVPDUWKRPHVHQHUJ\
emissions ± LQFOXGLQJ³'R\RXW\SLFDOO\ DUULYHKRPHDIWHUWKHEDUVVKXW"´³'R\RXFOLPEVWDLUVZKHQ\RXDUH
UHJLVWHUHGGLVDEOHG"´DQG³,I\RXKDYHW\SHGLDEHWHVZK\KDYHQ¶W\RXXVHGWKHWUHDGPLOOLQ\RXUOLYLQJURRPLQ
WKHIRUWQLJKWDQGLQVWHDGZDWFKHGKRXUVRI79´"VOLJKWO\SDUDSKUDVHd by Edwards). 
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V\VWHPVKRXOGWKHVHEHSDUWRIWKHVDPH³SULYDF\EXEEOH´DVWKHKRPH\RXRFFXS\":KDWDERXW
DGULYHUOHVV³FRQQHFWHGFDU´TXLWHOLNHO\QRWRZQHGE\\RXGLUHFWHGE\DPL[WXUHRI H[WHUQDO
sensor data, internal control and car to car communications and shared physically with others?  
These are ideas that Koops points out are  already showing up as problems in fields such as 
criminal procedure and evidence ± eg should my smartphone be protected from search in my 
home but not when I am arrested by the police? What about my laptop?  What about the location 
GDWDIURPP\QHZ%0:¶V*36"91  ± but their full impact may be felt in smart cities, where we 
live, work, commute and play all in the full glare of  pervasive data collection : an urban 
Panopticon, which Finch and Tene have inventivHO\FKULVWHQHGWKH³0HWURSWLFRQ92´ 
 
$NH\SRLQWLQWKH³SXEOLFQHVV´RIVPDUWFLWLHVLVWKDWGDWDGLVFORVXUHVE\UHVLGHQWVLQD³VPDUW´
city simply cannot be avoided. Finch and Tene point out that, unlike when choosing an online 
entertainment provider  sociDOQHWZRUNDVKRSSLQJVLWHRUDVHDUFKHQJLQHVD\³urban residents 
of smart cities have few alternatives to the government operated sensors and surveillance 
technologies .. deployed throughout the environs.. They will only have one smart grid, one 
subway system..93´ This is particularly true when it comes to essential services such as health, 
emergency response and policing. Even despite the onslaught of market deregulation, most of us 
do not still have the opportunity (or desire) to shop around for our fire service or bin lorry.  
Interestingly, Finch and Tene see this as worrying because they fear the extra power it may give 
a paternalistic government eg to demand an obese citizen walks rather than takes the (smart, 
FRQQHFWHGEXVWRZRUN³WKXVVDYLQJOLYHVDQGKHDOWKFDUHGROODUV´)RUD(XURSHDQWKHOLNHOLHU
danger seems to be that such data will fall via PPPs into the hands of private providers and from 
there to the open market, with negative impacts if it reaches (say) insurers94, employers or law 
enforcers. Finch and Tene argue the private marketplace has competition incentives to provide 
privacy which do not impact on governments. Yet this seems disingenuous: the history of private 
commercial Internet corporations has been one of a distinct lack of competition, where almost 
every company  relies on standard privacy policies to take as much personal data as possible, 
relying on consumer ignorance and inertia95 ODFN RI WUDQVSDUHQF\ DQG WKH ³ORFN LQ´ HIIHFW RI
network effects in industries such as social networking, to restrict pushback by consumers96. 
 
Privacy law, as a sub branch of human rights law, has of course moved on somewhat from the 
days when privacy in public was a blatant contradiction in terms. In Europe, the seminal 
Strasbourg case of von Hannover97 has required states to protect minimum reasonable 
expectations of privacy in public, even for public figures such as celebrity princesses.  In the US, 
                                                          
91 See Riley v California , US Supreme Court, July 25 2014, in which the US Supreme Court for first time decided 
that police needed warrants to search cellphones outside the home. Commentators noted the ruling almost certainly 
also applied to laptops etc : see Washington Post, June 25 2014 at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/26/us/supreme-
court-cellphones-search-privacy.html?_r=0 . 
92 6HH.HOVH\)LQFKDQG2PDU7HQH³:HOFRPHWRWKH0HWURSWLFRQ± 3URWHFWLQJ3ULYDF\LQD+\SHUFRQQHFWHG7RZQ´
2013-)RUGKDP8UE/-7KHLPSOLFDWLRQVRID³3DQRSWLFRQ´PD\LQIDFWEHLQDSSURSULDWHWRVPDUW
cities which are as much about peer to peer equiveillance and indeed sousveillance as traditional surveillance. The 
FRLQDJHLVKRZHYHUDUUHVWLQJ6HHDOVR:LVPDQ¶VUHIHUHQFHQVXSUD 
93 Supra n 90 at 1596. 
94 Life insurance companies have already started to offer better terms to customers who agree to wear FitBit-like 
SHUVRQDOKHDOWKWUDFNHUVDQGVKDUHWKHGDWD)DVFLQDWLQJO\DQDSSKDVDOUHDG\EHHQFUHDWHGFDOOHG³XQILW%LWV´ZKLFK
VSRRIVDVWUHDPRIVXFKGDWDWRIRROWKHLQVXUDQFHFRPSDQ\³Now you can play video games and harvest insurance 
perks, as your fitness monitor dutifully logs fake calories while strapped to your golden retriever or metronome´
6HH2OJD.KD]DQ³+RZWRIDNH\RXUZRUNRXW´The Atlantic, 28 September 2015. 
95 See . Arnold, . Hillebrand, and M Waldburge, ³3HUVRQDO'DWDDQGPrivacy - Final Report - 6WXG\IRU2IFRP´ 
WIK-Consult (May 2015), p 60  at http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/internet/personal-data-and-
privacy/Personal_Data_and_Privacy.pdf . 
96 6HHIXUWKHULQ/(GZDUGV³3ULYDF\/DZ&RGHDQG6RFLDO1HWZRUNLQJ6LWHV´LQ,%URZQHGResearch Handbook 
On Governance Of The Internet (2013, Edward Elgar) . 
97 ECtHR, Application no 59320/00, 24 June 2004. 
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however, despite the shift towards privacy-favourable decisions in the criminal law concerning 
searches in public of smartphones, and the legitimacy of trackers placed on cars98, in civil law it 
is still extremely difficult to establish a privacy cause of action relating to actions done, or data 
exposed in public99. Even in the UK, it is very difficult to  convince a court that what goes on, or 
is said in public has any expectations of privacy attached in circumstances not involving obvious 
harassment by paparazzi 6XUYHLOODQFH DQG GDWD PLQLQJ RI ³RSHQ´ VRFLDO PHGLD LQWHOOLJHQFH
³62&0,17´IRUexample, is regarded as lacking any element of privacy and thus not generally 
needing any police warrant or authorisation before it can be monitored, collected and data mined: 
even though such monitoring may contribute to profiling which in its turn may have substantial 
impact on individuals100. Similarly, the English Supreme Court recently held that a boy whose 
picture was captured on CCTV in the course of breaking the law as a rioter, had no rights to stop 
the police publicly spreading the image101.  (In both these cases, of course, it could be argued that 
the public interest in preventing crime and terror would (and did, in the latter case) outweigh any 
individual expectations of privacy102. ) 
 
Data protection (DP) law, by contrast, does not make any crucial private/public distinction 
H[FHSW LQ WKH H[HPSWLRQ LW JLYHV WR SXUHO\ GRPHVWLF RU ³KRXVHKROG´ SURFHVVLQJ RI GDWD103. Its 
category distinctions revROYHDURXQGZKHWKHU³SHUVRQDOGDWD´± data relating to you which makes 
\RX ³LGHQWLILHG RU LGHQWLILDEOH´104 -  is processed, not where that processing happens. For this 
reason, and because of its EU rather than global focus, the rest of this paper focuses on DP law 
not on general privacy law. 
 
It might be useful to ask at this point what expectations (if any)  the public have of privacy 
protection in smart cities, or failing data on that105, in their interaction with the IoT. Public trust 
and confidence in technologies are generally regarded as vital to their uptake, and doubt has 
already been recorded about public trust in IoT106, partly because of the security threats already 
                                                          
98 See n 89 supra; also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
99 See further  Daniel Solove The Future of Reputation (2007, Yale UP), ch 7. 
100 See Demos Report on Policing in an Information Age, 2013 at 
http://www.demos.co.uk/publications/policinginaninformationage /LOLDQ(GZDUGVDQG/DFKODQ8UTXDUW³3ULYDF\
in Public ± $5HDVRQDEOH([SHFWDWLRQ"7KH/HJDOLW\RI3ROLFH6XUYHLOODQFHRI6RFLDO0HGLD´IRUWKFRPLQJ 
101 See In the matter of an application by JR38 for Judicial Review (Northern Ireland) [2015] UKSC 42 . 
102 See observation in Wood v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [2008] EWHC 1105 (Admin) : [the English courts 
KDYH@³adopted a very robust approach to questions of interference with rights under Article 8(1) in relation to the 
taking of photographs in public places.. in assisting in the detection of crime´ 
103 Which is indeed space-dependent but controversially so: cf the CJEU decision in Lindqvist Case C-101/01 , 6 
November 2003 that just because a website was accessible to an indefinite number of people in cyberspace, its 
highly localised contents were not purely domestic or personal; similarly the more recent decision in Rynes Case 
C̻ 212/13 , 1 December 2014 that if a CCTV camera placed to protect a family home records images of the public 
street beyond, it must be more than a purely personal or domestic activity and thus caught by DP law. The CJEU 
rejected the idea in Lindqvist that any non commercial processing was purely personal. A strong view exists that this 
exemption should be more a de minimis principle and less a spatial one. 
104 See DPD, art 2. I consider below the issue of when personal data is rendered non-identifying or anonymised. 
105 This writer is not aware of any empirical survey work on attitudes to privacy in smart cities (she intends to carry 
some out as Researcher in Residence at the Digital Catapult in 2016), and there is only the very beginnings of  an 
academic literature on smart cities and privacy, with very little of it coming from legal, as opposed to information 
VFLHQFHVVFKRODUV)RUWKHIRUPHUDVZHOODV)LQFKDQG7HQHVXSUDQZKLFKIDOOVZLWKLQDSXEOLVKHG³VPDUWODZ´
symposium, see  Julia Lane et al eds Privacy, Big Data and the Public Good (2014, CUP)  and parts of Wisman, 
supra n 57.  In criminology, interest is emerging in the privacy and surveillance aspects of smart cities ± see notably 
.LWFKLQ¶VZRUNDOUHDG\FLWHGDQGFRQWLQXLQJDW7KH3URJUDPPDEOH&ity, Maynooth University, Dublin 
(http://www.maynoothuniversity.ie/progcity/ ) and Murakami-:RRG¶VRQJRLQJVWXG\RIJOREDOVPDUWFLWLHVDQG
surveillance at Queens University, Ontario, Canada (http://ubicity.ca/about/#sthash.XDlXItKK.dpbs ). 
106 6HHHJWKH8.¶VLQYHVWPHQWRIPWREXLOGD³&RPPLWPHQWWR3ULYDF\DQG7UXVWLQWKH,QWHUQHWRI7KLQJV
5HVHDUFK+XE&RP3D75,R7V´IROORZLQJWKH%ODFNHWW5HYLHZ¶VFRQFOXVLRQWKDWGHYHORSLQJWKH,R7PXVWEH
informed by appropriate security, trust , ethics and privacy guarantees. See Blackett Review The Internet of Things: 
making the most of the second digital revolution (2014). 
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discussed and partly because of general feelings among ordinary users of loss of control over 
personal data to third parties, most often seen in contexts such as social networks, search engines 
and targeted advertising107. A recent European Commission survey on Internet of Things 
Governance108 found that 67 RI UHVSRQGHQWV DJUHHG ³Internet of Things applications pose 
WKUHDWV WR WKHSURWHFWLRQRI DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V LGHQWLW\´ DQGwere concerned about how data 
acquired from the IoT would EH³used, stored, and accessed by whom´  
 
A 2014 US based Pew Internet research project interestingly canvassed around 1700 experts for 
their predictions about the IoT. 6RPH UHVSRQVHV ZHUH H[WUHPH ³There will be absolutely no 
privacy, not even in the jungle away from civilisation´Others wHUHUHVLJQHG³We might as well 
inject ourselves into the Internet of Things. By 2015 we will long ago have given up our privacy. 
The Internet of things will demand ± and we will willingly give ± RXUVRXOV«´109.  These surveys 
are probably untrustworthy in methodology but they do give  a flavour of the crisis of confidence 
about privacy and trust in IoT environments, including smart cities. 
 
V Privacy threats :  smart cities and dumb laws? 
 
Much has been written about the potential demise of privacy as a result of the technological 
society we now inhabit. In this section, I will discuss three leading sources of  technological 
threat to privacy, and argue that the smart city, as noted above, is the location for a  ³perfect 
storm´ FRQMXQFWLRQ of these threats. I will attempt in each case to  focus on what the key 
problems posed for European DP law are by each threat, especially in the context of smart cities.  
This discussion is necessarily abbreviated ; at least a book could be (and often has been) written 
on each problem below. In the next section, I canvas and critique some novel solutions to these 
problems drawn from both law and code. 
 
(i) The Internet of Things 
 
The Internet of Things (IoT), also known as ubiquitous computing (ubicomp),  ambient 
intelligence or pervasive computing has a long history in computer science but has only fairly 
recently come to the attention of lawyers. The Pew Research Center110 defines the IoT DV ³a 
global, immersive, invisible, ambient networked computing environment built through the 
continued proliferation of smart sensors, cameras, software, databases, and massive data 
centres in a world-spanning information fabric´ It is now over six years since the number of 
³WKLQJV´FRQQHFWHGWRWKH,QWHUQHWH[FHHGHGWKHQXPEHURISHRSOH111. Predictions in 2013/14 for 
the number of things that will be connected to the Internet by 2020 vary significantly, with 
Gartner predicting 25 billion112 and Cisco quoting 50 billion113 but there is general agreement 
that the IoT will be a vastly significant feature of future societies. According to Gartner, smart 
cities are one of the key sectors  for attracting  investment in the IoT space114. 
 
                                                          
107 See general discussion in Lilian Edwards and Charlotte Waelde eds  Law and the Internet (2009) chs14, 15 and 
16; Eurobarometer attitudes to privacy survey, June 2015, summary at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/files/factsheets/factsheet_data_protection_eurobarometer_240615_en.pdf . 
108 Conclusions of the Internet of Things public consultation, February 2013. See resource page at 
http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/news/conclusions-internet-things-public-consultation . 
109 6HH3HZ5HVHDUFK,QWHUQHWSURMHFW0D\³7KH,QWHUQHWRI7KLQJVZLOOWKULYHE\´DW
http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/05/14/internet-of-things/ . 
110 Supra n 107. 
111 FTC 2015, n 65 supra, at i. 
112 http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/2905717.  
113 http://share.cisco.com/internet-of-things.html.  
114 See Gartner: Hype Cycle for the Internet of Things (2015), available at 
https://www.gartner.com/doc/3098434/hype-cycle-internet-things- . 
 17 
 
There is a growing literature on the potential threat the IoT poses to privacy and increasing 
public awareness of the IoT, especially in the smart city context115, as a tool for pervasive   
surveillance. To give a flavour, the Guardian ran a series of articles on smart cities and privacy in 
2015, which at one point opined: 
 
³We may find ourselves interacting with thousands of little objects around us on a daily 
basis, each collecting seemingly innocuous bits of data 24/7, information these things will 
report to the cloud, where it will be processed, correlated, and reviewed. Your smart watch 
will reveal your lack of exercise to your health insurance company, your car will tell your 
insurer of your frequent speeding, and your dustbin will tell your local council that you are 
QRWIROORZLQJORFDOUHF\FOLQJUHJXODWLRQV7KLVLVWKH³LQWHUQHWRIVWRROSLJHRQV´DQGWKRXJK
it may sound far-IHWFKHGLW¶Valready happening.116´ 
 
The key problem of the IoT, for privacy purposes, is that its devices were explicitly designed to 
be unobtrusive and seamless as a user experience ; as Weiser puts it, to weave themselves ³into 
the fabric of daily life until they are LQGLVWLQJXLVKDEOH IURP LW´117. IoT systems, such as smart 
ambient lighting in a living room , or smart thermostats, such as NEST118 are often designed to 
be contextually aware of the needs and desires of the user,  collecting information about their 
daily practices and routines, whilst remaining ³LQYLVLEOHLQXVH¶´and ³unremarkable´ to users.119   
 
To contrast, when we share personal data in the online digital world ± for example on Facebook, 
Google, Amazon or eBay -  we are, even if dimly, aware of crossing a threshold into the domain 
of that platform, and usually have an opportunity, at least once,  to give or withold our consent to 
data collection, before we start to use the service (even if in reality our main option is either to 
take or entirely reject the service). In the IoT, such notice and opportunity are predominantly 
absent by design. Even where unobtrusiveness is not a function specification, IoT devices simply 
do not usually have means to display privacy notices DQGRU WR ³provide fine-tuned consent in 
line with the preferences expressed by individuals´as devices are usually small, screenless or 
lack an input mechanism (a keyboard or a touch screen) 120.  The problem is bad in domestic 
homes, and gets worse in the public places of smart cities. While consumers may at least have 
theoretically had a chance to read the privacy policy of their Nest thermostat before signing the 
contract, they will have no such opportunity in any real sense when their data is collected by the 
smart road or smart tram they go to work on, or as they pass the smart dustbin121 in the street. 
 
It is easy to see that in such systems, the conventional safeguards of consent in European DP 
ODZRU³QRWLFHDQGFKRLFH´LQWKH$PHULFan Fair Information Processing Principles122, will fail to 
operate as safeguards for consumer privacy. As Cas stated in an early paper, there is thus every 
                                                          
115 See Weber 2010; de Hert, Gutwirth  et al, 2008; Wisman, A29, Brown for ITU, FTC, Goodman 2015, Peppet 
2015 all these supra or infra;   
116 ³+DFNHGGRJDFDUWKDWVQRRSVRQ\RXDQGDIULGJHIXOORIDGYHUWVWKHSHULOVRIWKHLQWHUQHWRIWKLQJV³Guardian, 
11 March 2015 at http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/mar/11/internet-of-things-hacked-online-perils-
future . 
117 M. Weiser (1991) "The Computer for the 21st Century" Scientific American p1 . 
118 6HH³:KDW*RRJOHFDQUHDOO\GRZLWK1HVWRUUHDOO\1HVW¶VGDWD´Ars technica, 16 January 2014,  at 
http://arstechnica.com/business/2014/01/what-google-can-really-do-with-nest-or-really-nests-data/ . 
119 Peter Tolmie HWDO³Unremarkable computing´  Proc. CHI '02. ACM Press (2002), 399-406. 
120 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 8/2014 on the Recent developments on the Internet of Things, WP 223 (2014), 
p. 7, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2014/wp223_en.pdf  KHUDIWHU³$:3,R7´ 
121 6HH³&LW\RI/RQGRQFDOOVKDOWWRVPDUWSKRQHWUDFNLQJELQV´%%&1HZV$XJXVW 
122  See Gellman, Robert, Fair Information Practices: A Basic History Version 2.13 (February 11, 2015), p. 11, at 
http://bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rg-FIPShistory.pdf . 
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possibility that ³ubiquitous computing will erode all central pillars of current privacy 
SURWHFWLRQ´.123  
 
EU law  
 
EU law demands in art 7 of the Data Protection Directive (DPD) that data controllers have a 
lawful ground for processing of personal data124, with consent being only one such ground 
among several125. Indubitably, many or most IoT systems in smart cities will process personal 
data, unless steps have been taken to effectively anonymise it (see below). Consent is defined in 
DUWRIWKH'3'DVD³freely given, specific and informed indication of his wishes by which the 
data subject signifies his agreement to personal data relating to him being processed´ 7KLV
definition is, as we have seen,  considerably troubled by the features of the IoT environment.  In 
Europe, the Article 29 Working Party126 has  raised a significant number of issues about consent 
in addition to the sheer difficulty of giving it, including the fact that data may be shared 
automatically machine to machine, with no transparency to the user or opportunity to review; 
and that the quality of any user consent may be poor. Crucially, they state WKDW³the possibility to 
renounce certain services or features of an IoT device is more  a theoretical concept than a real 
alternative.. such situations lead to the question of whether the users consent to the underlying 
data processLQJFDQWKHQEHFRQVLGHUHGDVIUHHKHQFHYDOLGXQGHU(8ODZ´   
 
But consent, it should be remembered,  is not the only ground for lawful processing nor does it 
have any particular priority. If consent in EU DP terms is impossible, expensive or counter-
productive to obtain, data controllers may well choose to avoid it entirely. Where IoT systems 
are used to prevent or detect crime (as with most smart CCTV systems) then data protection law 
may exempVSURFHVVLQJ IURPDUW¶VGHPDQGV Where local or national governmental agencies 
gather data for eg e-government systems, e-health, e-welfare, WKHQDJURXQGRI³SXEOLFLQWHUHVW´
can also sidestep any need for consent.  But for most commercial systems, what we might expect 
to come to see is DKHDY\UHOLDQFHRQWKH³OHJLWLPDWHLQWHUHVWV´JURXQGRIDUWIwhich would be 
a worryingly easy way to avoid  any semblance of user control. This is especially plausible given 
the likelihood of this ground emerging watered down still further in the final thrashout of 
negotiations in the GDPR127.  The Art 29 WP clearly shares these concerns and goes out of its 
way in its 2014 Opinion to stress that, following Google Spain128, it is unlikely processing of 
GDWDYLD,R7UHYHDOLQJWKH³individual state of health, home or intimacy, his/her location and .. 
his/her private life´ZLOO ³EH MXVWLILHGE\PHUHO\ WKHHFRQRPLF LQWHUHVW´ of an IoT stakeholder, 
given the need to balance this against the fundamental rights of the data subject129. 
 
Art 7 of the DPD may furthermore be read as overlaid by art 5(3) of the PECD, which requires, 
VLQFHLWVUHYLVLRQLQWKDWZKHUH³Lnformation´ LVVWRUHGRQWKH³terminal equipment130 of a 
                                                          
123 -&DV³8ELTXLWRXV&RPSXWLQJ3ULYDF\DQG'DWD3URWHFWLRQ´LQ6*XWZLUWKHWDOComputers, 
Privacy and Data Protection: An Element of Choice (Springer) p167 . 
124 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (hereafter data 
3URWHFWLRQ'LUHFWLYHRU³'3'´ 
125 Ibid, art 7(a). 
126 A29 WP IoT , supra n 119. See further on consent, E Kosta Consent in European Data Protection Law 
(Brill/Nijhoff, 2013). 
127 The EP Big Data and Smart Devices UHSRUWQRWHV³OHJLWLPDWHLQWHUHVWV´DV³WKHYDJXHVWJURXQGIRUSURFHVVLQJ´
and a key worry as negotiations over the draft GDPR move into the trilogue (supra n 20 at 32). 
128 CJEU, 13 May 2014, case C-131/12, cited at A29 WP IoT, supra n 119, para 4.2. 
129 It should also be noticed that if sensitive personal data is processed ± as will invariably be the case in a health 
related IoT system such as telemedicine for the aged, then processing can in most circumstamces only be legitimised 
by explicit consent and  WKH³OHJLWLPDWHLQWHUHVWV´JURXQGZLOOQRWGR'3'DUW 
130 7KLVSKUDVHLVXQGHILQHGLQWKH3(&'7KH$:3,R7VXJJHVWVKHOSIXOO\LW³EHXQGHUVWRRGLQWKHVDPHPDQQHU
DVWKDWRI³HTXLSPHQW´LQDUWF´SDUD 
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user´(or access if given to it when it is already stored there) the user must give consent to such 
storageKDYLQJEHHQSURYLGHGZLWK³FOHDUDQGFRPSUHKHQVLYH LQIRUPDWLRQ´DERXW WKHSXUSRVHV
for which that information will be processed. Consent is the only way such storage can be 
legitimised;  there are no alternative grounds. &RQVHQW DVQRWHGDERYH PXVWEH ³LQIRUPHG´E\
prior comprehensive information, but need not be explicit. This provision was originally 
intended, in the early days of e-commerce, to control the placing of ³OHJLWLPDWH´cookies on a 
XVHU¶VFRPSXWHUZLWKRut their knowledge and consent, as a privacy matter, as well as obviously 
harmful spyware or malware. It is now unclear how far this provision applies to data about users 
collected from sensors of various kinds LQ WKH ³UHDO ZRUOG´. Attempts were made during the 
passage of the 2009 amendments to the PECD to amend art 5(3) to give it a wider and clearer 
applicability to many other types of ³devices´ than cookies, notably ³URRWNLWV´RIWKHW\SHXVHG
in the Sony Mediamax scandal of 2003,  but for political reasons, these resulted only in a change 
in the recitals131. Recital 56 of the  PECD now UHDGV ³When such devices are connected to 
publicly available electronic communications networks or make use of electronic 
communications services as a basic infrastructure, the relevant provisions of Directive 
2002/58/EC.. , including those on security, traffic and location data and on confidentiality, 
should apply´ Our main concern here is if art 5(3) applies to information collected about users 
by IoT sensors (such as RFID chips) ± a question which is predicated on (i) whether such 
LQIRUPDWLRQ LV VWRUHG RQ WKH ³terminal equipment of the user´ DQG LL LI SHU UHFLWDO  WKH
QHWZRUNVWKH,R7VHQVRUVDUHFRQQHFWHGWRTXDOLI\DV³SXEOLF´HQRXJKWRIDOOXnder the scope of 
the expanded post-2009 PECD. 
 
:KHQLV,R7FROOHFWHGGDWDVWRUHGLQWKH³terminal equipment.. of a user´"The A29 Opinion132 
gives the example of a smart pedometer (say a Fitbit) owned and worn by a user A, and 
periodically synchronized via the Internet, which records and shares the number of steps taken 
by a user and their location. This would arguably be information which at the point of collection 
is ³stored in the terminal equipment of the user´  (even though it is then uploaded to the Fitbit 
cloud server for further processing) and so under art 5(3), the consent of A would be required. 
But if the same user has their location and kilometers travelled collected by a smart  driverless or 
³FRQQHFWHG´FDUDFWLQJDVDVKDUHGWD[LVHUYLFHLVWKH³XVHU´SHUVRQ$RULVLWWKHowner, or the 
operator (who may not be the same person) of the connected car? The A29 Opinion interprets 
this as meaning the consent of A remains required; this writer is less sure. Art 5(3) also refers to 
WKHHTXLSPHQWRID³VXEVFULEHU´ZKRKVWKHULJKWWRDOWHUQDWHO\JLYHWKHUHOHYDQWFRQVHQW- which 
is a clear notion in the context of a mobile phone  but much less so in a smart IoT public space 
environment. If we change the example further to steps counted by a smart path or escalator in a 
shopping mall, say, then it becomes increasingly hard to distort the English language to see the 
HVFDODWRUDVWKH³WHUPLQDOHTXLSPHQW´RI$DVXVHUUDWKHUWKDQRID³VXEVFULEHU´ZKRPLJKWEH
the mall manager or indeed, of no one at all.  
 
A further problem is that the art 5(3)  applies aince 2009 to where information is collected by 
devices connected to ´publicly available electronic communications networks´. If a smart city is 
³LQVWDOOHG´E\&Lsco and many systems run on their private networks, do the rights in art 5(3) 
apply? Probably as this formulation was intended to extend coverage to private networks 
connected to the public Internet; but not with entire certainty.  The European DP Supervisor 
criticised the failure to amend this  scope restriction in 2009133 but the alternate proposed 
                                                          
131
 6HH(.RVWD³3HHNLQJLQWRWKH&RRNLH-DUWKH(XURSHDQDSSURDFKWRZDUGVWKHUHJXODWLRQRIFRRNLHV´ (2013) 21 
IJLIT 380 and Citizens Rights Directive, recital 65 (Directive 2009/136/ECamending Directive 2002/22/EC.) 
132 Supra n 131. 
1336HHWKH(XURSHDQ'DWD3URWHFWLRQ6XSHUYLVRU¶V6HFRQG2pinion on the Review of the PECD, 9 January 2009 at 
http://www.edps.europa.eu/ .  See also criticism from the European commission in in Radio Frequency 
Identification (RFID) in Europe: steps towards a policy framework´3&20ILQDO0DUFK 
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formulation, that the PECD should apply generally to ³publicly accessible private networks´ was 
unfortunately not added.   
 
One further ³JHWRXWRIMDLO´FDUGIRU,R7 developers here is the exception from art 5(3) where 
VWRUDJHLV³strictly necessary in order to provide a service explicitly requested by the subscriber 
or user´,WVHHPVORJLFDOly assertable that the location of a connected car must be collected for it 
to work and that service has been explicitly requested by the passengers and/or the operator (who 
LV RQH DVVXPHV WKH ³VXEVFULEHU´?). What is less clear is (a) did they have any alternative, in 
which case art 5(3) is reduced to nugatory and (b) if the re-use of that location data for building a 
profile to provide targeted ads (say) benefits from the exemption.  
 
One answer to many of the inclarities here would be speedy amendment of art 5(3) when the 
PECD comes up for review after the GDPR is finalised. Another would be for data controllers to 
avoid the issue entirely by  making sure that such information if collected in public places was 
effectively de-identified so that it was not personal data at all. However this would sometimes be 
impossible if the service was to be delivered and more often would likely make it of little added 
commercial value. We discuss this below. 
 
(ii) Big data  
 
Big data, like smart cities, is a buzz word which is much mentioned but has no one clear 
meaning134. ,WLVIUHTXHQWO\UHODWHGWRLGHDVRI³YROXPHYHORFLW\DQGYDULHW\´ZLWKWKHHPSKDVLV
on the first135.  Big data has come to the fore for three reasons: the costs of both storage and 
processing of data have dramatically fallen;  algorithms for analysing huge amounts of data have 
LPSURYHGKHQFH³GDWDDQDO\WLFV´DUHDNH\SDUWRIWKHVWRU\ ; and, perhaps most importantly,  
the online data industries ± and now the IoT industries - have created incredibly vast pools of 
data to mine.  
 
Smart cities are consumers and producers of big data. Kitchin reports that post-millenium, the 
XUEDQ GDWD ODQGVFDSH KDV EHHQ WUDQVIRUPHG WUDQVLWLRQLQJ IURP ³VPDOO´ WR ³ELJ´ GDWD DV WKH
generation of GDWDVHWV KDV EHFRPH ³FRQWLQXRXV H[KDXVWLYH« ILQH-grained, relational and 
IOH[LEOH´ ³)URP D SRVLWLRQ RI UHODWLYH GDWD VFDUFLW\ WKH VLWXDWLRQ LV WXUQLQJ WR RQH RI GDWD
deluge´ 136.  In modern urbanity, data generated within traditional city infrastructure and utilities 
eg transportation,  gas, electricity and water, have not only become digital flows, but are also 
now complemented by and combined with big data generated by commercial private companies 
(eg mobile phone operators, social media, website owners, often via commercial data brokers) 
and crowdsourced open data (eg citizen science initiatives).  At present much of this data lives in 
silos; but increasingly it will be combined by public city managers and private service providers 
alike. , as is already the case in some smart city applications, eg the centralised control rooms for 
city monitoring found in Rio de Janeiro137.  
 
IoT applications are particularly prodigal in their creation of big data. The FTC in their IoT 
UHSRUWQRWHGWKDW³the sheer volume of data that even a small number of devices can generate is 
VWXQQLQJ >ZH KHDUG WKDW@ IHZHU WKDQ  KRXVHKROGV ³FDQ JHQHUDWH  PLOOLRQ GLVFUHWH
GDWD SRLQWV D GD\´´138. These massive volumes of granular data generated from IoT systems 
                                                          
134 See inter alia discussions in reports cited at n 51. Big dat is so overused a term it has in fact been removed  from 
WKH³K\SHF\FOH´E\*DUWQHUVHHVupra n 55. 
135 See eg ICO Big data report, supra n 51 at 6, drawing on Gartner Research work. 
136 5RE.LWFKLQ³'DWDGULYHQQHWZRUNHGXUEDQLVP´7KH3URJUDPPDEOH&LW\:3$XJXVWDW
http://www.spatialcomplexity.info/files/2015/08/SSRN-id2641802.pdf  . 
137 See discussion above n 44.  
138 FTC 2015 supra n 65 at 14. 
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allow inference of data on a previously unprecedented scale. Smartphones already allow 
LQIHUHQFHV FRQFHUQLQJ D XVHU¶V PRRG VWUHVV OHYHOV SHUVRQDOLW\ W\SH SV\FKRORJLFDO GLVRUGHUV
smoking habits, demographic characteristics, sleep patterns, happiness and levels of exercise and 
movement139; the full IoT inputs of a smart city on its individual citizens will allow much, much 
PRUH$V:LVPDQFRPPHQWV³Bentham¶s Panopticon is child¶s play compared to surveillance 
in a fully functioning IoT140´ 
 
Smart cities thus both generate big data sets and function by processing them. In both cases, ³big 
GDWD´ need not involve personal data, but  almost invariably will do so. Even where data is 
generated with apparent anonymity ± eg footfall in public squares - the relative ease of 
associating two large databases ± say a fottfall database and a CCTV database - to identify 
persons, is by now well known141.  The EDPS noted firmly LQWKDW³it is now rare for data 
generated by user activity to be completely and irrevocably anonymised´142.  Datamining across 
more than one dataset to put together an identity of a known person from disparate sources, even 
where there have been attempts at deidentification, is sometimes called the ³PRVDLF HIIHFW143´
User pictures, real names  or online nicknames can also often be used as unique or near unique 
identifiers across multiple databases. In privacy circles144,  the  key worries around ³ELJGDWD´
thus lie in: 
 
(i) the potential for reidentification of allegedly anonymised or pseudonymised data   
(ii) the repurposing RI³ELJdata´ collected for purposes different from the original;  
(iii) the lack of transparency as to how results are derived from big data, in particular where 
PHUHFRUUHODWLRQHJ³\RXQJEODFNPHQDUHPRUHRIWHQLQYROYHGLQYLROHQWFULPHV´ with 
FDXVDWLRQ³\RXQJEODFNPHQVKRXOGEHWKHILUVWWREHDUUHVWHGRQVXVSLFLRQZKHQYLROHQW
FULPHVRFFXU´ 
(iv) WKHWUHQGWRZDUGVH[KDXVWLYHFROOHFWLRQRI³DOOWKHGDWD´DQGDZD\IURPWKHSULQFLSOHRI
minimisation of data collection generally promoted by DP law.  
 
A particular worry revolves around the potential for subtle non-transparent discrimination based 
on data analysis145 DQG WKHSRVVLEOHFUHDWLRQRID³GDWDXQGHUFODVV´, unable to access the same 
services and facilities as their peers because of their ³ELJGDWD´SURILOH -  DQHZNLQGRI ³UHG-
OLQLQJ´146. Acording to the A29 WP, ³analytics based on information caught in an IoT 
HQYLURQPHQWPLJKWHQDEOHWKHGHWHFWLRQRIDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VHYHQPRUHGHWDLOHGDQGFRPSOHWHOLIH
and behaviour patterns.´147 This might lead to the denial of insurance; exclusion from the sale of 
                                                          
139 ,ELGGUDZLQJRQ6FRWW3HSSHW³5HJXODWLQJWKH,QWHUQHWRI7KLQJV)LUVW6WHSV7RZDUG Managing Discrimination, 
3ULYDF\6HFXULW\DQG&RQVHQW´7H[DV/DZ5HYLHZIRUWKFRPLQJSS-67, at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2409074 . 
140 Wisman, supra n 58, section 3. 
141 6HHOLWHUDWXUHIROORZLQJ3DXO2KP¶VVHPLQDOGLVFXVVLRQ³%URNHQ3URPLVHVRI3ULYDF\5HVSRQGLQJWRWKH
6XUSULVLQJ)DLOXUHRI$QRQ\PL]DWLRQ´ (2009) 57 UCLA Law Review 1701. 
142 EDPS, supra n 51 . 
143 See eg http://www.computerworld.com/article/2563635/security0/sidebar--the-mosaic-effect.html . 
144 See further discussion in Bert--DDS.RRSV³7KHWURXEOHZLWK(XURSHDQGDWDSURWHFWLRQODZ´(2014) 4 (4) 
International Data Privacy Law  250. 
145 6HHRQWKHGXHSURFHVVLPSOLFDWLRQVRIVXFKRUODFNWKHUHRI³'&LWURQDQG)3DVTXDOH³7KH6FRUHG6RFLHW\
'XH3URFHVVIRU$XWRPDWHG3UHGLFWLRQV´:DVKLQJWRQ/DZ5HYLHZ9RO6XFKZRUULHV are already 
well known in the literature in relation to conventional online data profiling, as opposed to profiling involving IoT 
data: see notably  the work of Oscar Gandy and Latanya Sweeney ; Big Data and Smart Devices, supra n 20 at 12, 
citing the revelation in April 2015 that female users were shown fewer targeted ads delivered by Google using data 
profiling techniques for higher paid jobs than male users (n 21 on p 12). On discrimination in smart cities 
particularly, see Finch and Tene, supra n 90 at 1602-1604. 
146 Marc Ambasna--RQHV³7KHVPDUWKRPHDQGDGDWDXQGHUFODVV´Guardian , 3 August 2015,  at 
http://www.theguardian.com/media-network/2015/aug/03/smart-home-data-underclass-internet-of-things . 
147 A29 WP IoT, supra n 119 at  8. 
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certain luxury or high end products; sharing of compromising inferences with state agencies148; 
or even total exclusion from markets for service and essential utilities for those unwilling to 
share personal data. In a smart city the consequences of data exclusion would be physical as well 
as digital. Certain people (or their cars) might be physically restricted from entering some streets 
± DQHZW\SHRI³JDWHGFRPPXQLW\´± or certain shops or entertainment complexes. The complex 
nature of public-private partnership in smart cities also seems important here ± what happens to 
any right to assembly in public squares (or public speech generally) when all spaces are at least 
partly privatised? 
 
Another practical worry is that IoT data is quite likely full of errors , and hence so would be the 
derived ´ELJGDWD´ profiles. Townsend has already concisely predicted that smart cities and IoT 
systems  will be ³EXJJ\DQGEULWWOH´149 Kitchin emphasises that because datastreams in a smart 
city are all generated in different ways, using a plethora of instruments and standards, joining 
them together will result in misleading data of poor quality150. 
 
Big data and EU law 
 
DP law interacts problematically with ³ELJ GDWD´ LQ DW OHDVW WKUHH LPSRUWDQW ZD\V: purpose 
limitation, algorithmic transparency and data minimisation. 
 
First, and most importantly, DP is fundamentally based on the idea that data must be gathered for 
³specified, explicit and legitimate´ SXUSRVHV DQG not further processed in a way incompatible 
with those purposes151 7KLV³purpose limitation´UXOHDSSOLHVHYHQZKHUHSURFHVVLQJKDVEHHQ
legitimised by a ground other than consent. Big data is quintessentially at odds with this 
principle. As Mayer-Schoenberger and Cukier put in in their best selling book, ³in a Big Data 
DJH PRVW LQQRYDWLYH VHFRQGDU\XVHVKDYHQ¶WEHHQ LPDJLQHGZKHQ WKHGDWD LV ILUVW FROOHFWHG". 
Rather than regarding this as DSUREOHPWKHDXWKRUVFRQWLQXHH[FLWHGO\³there is a treasure hunt 
underway´152. It can be (and is) argued153 that the big data assault on purpose limitation can be 
dealt with by a number of legal strategies, including asking consent for plausible re-uses at the 
start, obtaining a new consent to re-uses of data as they arise, or using a non-consent based 
JURXQG VXFK DV ³OHJLWLPDWH LQWHUHVWV´ to make repurposing lawful. However, in each case, it 
seems apparent that the solution is in fact illusory. A blanket consent to all possible reuses would 
LWVHOIEHVRYDJXHDVWRIDLOWKH³VSHFLILFDQGOLPLWHGSXUSRVHV´WHVWVHHNLQJDQHZFRQVHQWZRXOG
also most certainly involve prohibitive overheads for commercial and public service data 
controllers alike; and reversion to a ³legitimate interests´ test asks almost compellingly for 
abuse, given the difficulties of oversight and the delegation of the task of balancing commercial 
interests and user fundamental rights to the controller themselves.  Finally and most 
problematically, one much cited feature of data mining is that it may give you answers to 
questions not even previously thought of ± providing answers to QRWMXVWWKH³NQRZQXQNQRZQV´
EXWWKH³XQNQRZQXQNQRZQV´154. In such scenarios, it is hard to see how any pretense at purpose 
limitation can prevail.  
 
                                                          
148 See Brown, supra  n 69. 
149 Supra n 14. 
150 It is worth noting that DP contains a right for data subjects to correct errors in personal data about them. How 
should this right be exercised in an age of reused data and non transparent data profiling? 
151 DPD, art 6(b). 
152 Viktor Mayer-Schoenberger and Kenneth Cukier Big Data: A Revolution That Will Transform How We Live, 
Work and Think (John Murray, 2013) at 15. 
153 See Art 29 WP Opinion 03/2013 on purpose limitation; supplemented by WP 221, Statement on  
Statement of the WP29 on the impact of the development of big data on the protection of individuals with regard to 
the processing of their personal data in the EU, September 2014. 
154 See Kirk Borne, TED talk, 10 June 2013, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zr02fMBfuRA . 
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Secondly, big data defies the fundamental DP idea of transparency of processing. Big data acts 
DVD³EODFNER[´155; data goes in, outputs come out, but the algorithm that creates the result is 
usually invisible to the user and the results often inscrutable. Algorithms also learn and change, 
in a  semi autonomous fashion ± making them remarkably hard to document. Finally algorithms 
are the ultimate trade secret ± *RRJOH¶VIRUWXQe is arguably based entirely around its advances in 
search algorithm ± and so companies will be remarkably unwilling to make them public. Opaque 
big data algorithms are dangerous because discrimination which might otherwise be illegal, eg 
on race or sexual orientation, can easily be hidden, deliberately or not,  behind the algorithmic 
veil (as discussed above). While subject access rights to find out what data is held about them by 
a data controller are reasonably well known ( at least to lawyers and campaigners), very little 
DWWHQWLRQLVSDLGWRDULJKWDOVRJUDQWHGE\FXUUHQW'3ODZWRNQRZWKH³logic of the processing´
applied to your data156. This right to what might now be called algorithmic transparency has 
always been limited by a carve out to protect intellectual property and trade secrets157 and may 
yet be further watered down in the GDPR158 - but it remains at least a fig leaf to transparency. 
How it  can be applied and used as consumer protection in the big data world is hard to see: even 
if the controller actually knows what his algorithm is up to (which many now doubt in vast 
SURFHVVLQJVFHQDULRVVXFKDV*RRJOH¶VVHDUFKDOJRULWKPKRZFDQWKHUHVXOWEHFRQYH\HGWRWKH
data subject in any comprehensible way?159  
 
Thirdly, big data also stands in stark opposition to the principle that personal data collected  must  
be  ³adequate,  relevant  and  not  excessive´  in  relation  to  the purposes  for  which  they  are  
collected  and/or  further  processed160: a principle now reified in the drDIW*'35DVWKDWRI³data 
PLQLPLVDWLRQ´.  Yet when data scientists are consulted, their passion for the newfound ability to 
FROOHFW³DOO WKHGDWD´, without the old fiddly statistical constraints of sample size, demographic 
representation, cleansing data of outliers et al, is palpable. Data minimisation is a peculiar 
restriction to a data scientist, as opposed to a privacy advocate, in an era where it is cheaper, 
easier and more useful to collect all the data than some of it, and where basic commercial and 
human drives point towards acquiring as much data as possible just in case it comes in useful for 
WKDW³WUHDVXUHKXQW´LQWKHIXWXUH$V%XWWDUHOOLWKHFXUUHQW('36 UHFHQWO\GHFODUHG³there is a 
worrying drift towards thinking that with regards to personal information, whatever is possible 
LVDOVRGHVLUDEOH¶LISHUVRQDOGDWDDUHDYDLODEOHWKH\VKRXOGEHFROOHFWHGDQGVWRUHGLQGHILQLWHO\
and exploited for any expeGLHQWSXUSRVH´161. 
 
These problems are not really soluble without either major alteration of big data business models 
or EU law. In fact most data mining, excessive collection  and subsequent repurposing of data is 
justified, not by proof of compliance with the DP law outlined above, but by the claim that what 
is processed is not personal data at all. As already noted above, the EDPS has called this out for 
what it usually is : the replacement of true anonymisation with pseudonymisation of dubious 
privacy-protective value, for the very good reason that far less commercial value, now or in the 
                                                          
155 See Frank Pasquale The Black Box Society (Harvard UP, 2015). 
156 DPD, art 12(a). 
157 DPD, recital 41. 
158 6HH/LOLDQ(GZDUGV³5LVHRIWKH$OJRULWKPV´SDSHUJLYHQDW*LNLL%RXUQHPRXWKVOLGHVDW
http://www.slideshare.net/lilianed/gikii-13-algorithms . 
159 Mayer-6FKRHQEHJHUDQG&XNLHUVXSUDQVXJJHVWDQHZSURIHVVLRQRI³DOJRULWKPLVW´ZKRLQWHUSUHWWKHVH
results to the ordinary user. It is hard to see how the user could check the algorithmist had it right, or check that they 
were acting independently of the data controller. See further below on algorithmic transparency, pX. 
160 DPD, art 6  ( c). 
161 Speech to the Academy of European /DZ³%LJGDWDELJGDWDSURWHFWLRQFKDOOHQJHVDQGLQQRYDWLYHVROXWLRQV³
11 May 2015 at 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/EDPS/Publications/Speeches/2015
/15-05-11_ERA_speech_EN.pdf . 
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future, can be extracted from truly anonymised data162. Pseudonymised data profiles, as used eg 
by social media and search engines to deliver targeted advertising, still allow individuals to be 
³VLQJOHGRXW´DQGVXEMHFWHGWRGLVFULPLQDWRU\WUHDWPHQWVLPSO\QRWE\QDPH A turf war is going 
on between what the Article 29 WP thinks is sufficient anonymisation, and what  commercial 
businesses and some national regulators would like it to be163, while meanwhile most users (and 
most lawyers)  have no way of knowing what to make, if anything,  of  competing claims of 
successful anonymisation, pseudonymisation or encryption164. 
 
Yet despite having acutely identified the problems above and more, the  Article 29 WP and the 
EDPS  continue on the whole to maintain that data protection can survive big data without major 
reconstruction or demolition. ³The  Working  Party  acknowledges  that  the  challenges  of  big  
data  might  require  innovative thinking on how some of these and other key data protection 
principles are applied in practice. However,  at  this  stage,  it  has  no  reason  to  believe  that  
the  EU  data  protection  principles,  as  they are currently enshrined in Directive 95/46/EC, are 
no longer valid and appropriate for the development  of  big  data,  subject  to  further  
improvements  to  make  them  more  effective  in practice´165. This writer would counter argue 
that the faltering progress of the GDPR on key points such as the definition of consent, the extent 
RIWKH³OHJLWLPDWHLQWHUHVWV´JURXQGIRUSURFHVVLQJDQGWKHVXGGHQLQYHQWLRQRIDQLOOWKRXJKWRXW
category of pseudonymous data166 halfway through the legislative process, seem to tell 
otherwise. 
 
The A29 WP , the EDPS and European privacy advocates in general may feel constrained to  
continually assert the effectiveness of the principles of DP as it stands because the alternative, 
forcibly presented by much of industry167, some of science168,  and some US policy bodies169  
and scholarship170, is to cede legal control over collection of data, in favour of deferring 
safeguards to the time of use. Such an approach has the comforting appearance of being  steeped 
in pragmatism, social benefit and cost saving; enables state surveillance bodies to claim they are 
HQJDJHGLQKDUPOHVV³EXONFROOHFWLRQ´ of metadata rather than LOOHJDO³VXUYHLOODQFH´171; rubber-
                                                          
162 This is not just a problem for businesses. Medical researchers also complain that true anonymisation makes their 
research more difficult and less useful, especially to the patients who donated their data. 
163 See, ,QIRUPDWLRQ &RPPLVVLRQHU¶V 2IILFHAnonymisation: managing data protection risk code of practice. 
(November 2012) available at https://ico.org.uk/media/1061/anonymisation-code.pdf  ; cf Article 29 WP, Opinion 
05/2014 on Anonymisation Techniques WP216 (April 10, 2014). 
164 Note the HP/Fortify IoT Research Study, supra n 70 at 4,: 80% of IoT devices tested raised privacy concerns , not 
OHDVWWKDWDVWUDQVPLWWHGXQHQFU\SWHGSHUVRQDOLQIRUPDWLRQWKH\ZHUH³RQHQHWZRUNPLVFRQILJXUDWLRQDZD\
IURPH[SRVLQJWKLVGDWDWRWKHZRUOG´ 
165 A29 WP 221.  
166 Revised article 4(2a) of the European Parliament draft. 
167 See Craig Mundie, ³Privacy Pragmatism: Focus on Data Use, Not Data Collection´ Foreign Affairs (2014) 29 at 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2014-02-12/privacy-pragmatism. Mundie is a senior adviser to Microsoft;  
Letter from Daniel W. Caprio, Jr., Senior Strategic Advisor, Transatlantic Computing Continuum Policy Alliance, to 
Donald S. Clark and FTC (January 10, 2014), available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_comments/2014/01/00017-88305.pdf  in which many large 
IoT players including AT&T, General Electric, Intel Corporation, and Oracle Corporation support the move. 
168 See for urban data and smart city researcher perspectives, several essays in Lane et al eds, supra n 103, especially 
FKDSWHU³'DWHIRUWKH3XEOLF*RRG&KDOOHQJHVDQG%DUULHUVLQWKH&RQWH[WRI&LWLHV´³Privacy rules and 
regulations and bureaucratic silos often prevent city officials from obtaining and using data to address some of their 
most intractable problems´ 
169 See Executive Office of the President, ³%LJ 'DWD 6HL]LQJ 2SSRUWXQLWLHV 3UHVHUYLQJ 9DOXHV´ (2014), at p56, 
available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big_data_privacy_report_may_1_2014.pdf.  Note 
however WKH)7&¶VRSSRVLWLRQWRWKLVDSSURDFKVHH)7&VXSUDQDWYL±vii. 
170 See eg Fred H. Cate, Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, Notice and Consent in a World of Big Data,  Microsoft Global 
Privacy Summit Summary Report and Outcomes (November 2012) at 5. 
171 See David Anderson A Question of Trust ± Report of the Investigatory Powers Review , June 11 2015 (available 
at https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/a-question-of-trust-report-of-the-investigatory-powers-
review/ ). 
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VWDPSVWKH³WUHDVXUHKXQW´and piling high of big data; and alleviates the intractable difficulties 
of getting a valid and informed consent out of passers by to data collection in the IoT. The 
problem is, as the FTC recognise, that delaying safeguards to use not collection simply does  not 
protect privacy, either in actuality or in expectations. Once data is into the bag, it will be 
impossibly hard to police it at some later time when it has been processed, profiled, 
³anonymised´, data mined, reidentified, copied , mirrored and sent around the globe to various 
jurisdictions with varying laws, powers of enforcement and social norms re privacy. It will also 
be difficult if not impossible to find consensus on what uses are particularly pernicious. 
Particularly in UHODWLRQWR³VHQVLWLYHGDWD´ as the FTC agree172  ± ie mainly, health data ±  people 
are understandably worried at the prospect of collection as well as of use.  
 
In summary therefore DP law as currently constituted has no good answers for dealing with the 
privacy problems presented by Big Data. Answers may conceivably come from other legal 
instruments such as discrimination and employment law, or from assertion of due process rights 
under art 6 of the ECHR. Smart cities are likely to be venues for such disputes. 
 
(iii) The Cloud 
 
Finally it has to be noted that, of course, most of the vast amount of data generated in smart cities 
will be stored in the Cloud. Cloud computing is typically based on the provision  of resources to 
users from a network of servers and of providers and sub-providers, with data storage,  software 
and infrastructure all made dynamLFDOO\DYDLODEOH³DVDVHUYLFH´ usually with huge advantages in 
speed, cost and scaleability to the consumer or business using the Cloud.  Data in the cloud 
typically has an unknown and varying place of storage and/or processing, often compounded by 
multiple back ups or distributed processing of data in multiple jurisdictions.  It is sometimes 
possible to specify contractually that data will not be stored or processed outside the EU173 but 
this is at present very unusual in the consumer market, for reasons of logistics on the part of the 
dominant US companies in the market, and the lack of a strong homegrown EU cloud industry 
sector. The widespread use of cloud computing for receiving  and processing data from smart 
IoT devices and applications thus raises thorny legal issues revolving around jurisdiction and 
applicable law174 compounded by the difference in privacy cultures already pointed out between 
the US (where most of the major cloud computing providers are based) and the EU.  
 
The Cloud and EU law 
 
The DPD provides for the free flow of personal data to countries located outside the EEA only if 
the country or the recipient provides an ³adequate´ level of data protection, thus potentially 
limiting cross-border data transfers. Given the very small number of countries outside the EEA 
ZKLFKKDYHHVWDEOLVKHGWKH\KDYH³DGHTXDWH´'3RUVLPLODUUHJLPHVWhe exemptions provided by 
Article 26 of DPD to enable transfer data out of the EEA have become crucial. They include a 
number of grounds including the consent of the data subject,  the ³VDIHharboU´ scheme  in the 
case of transfers to US companies, model contractual clauses and binding corporate rules 
(BCRs).  
 
                                                          
172 )7&VXSUDQDWDQGQ1RWHWKDWWKH)7&GRVXJJHVWWKDWVRPH³XVHEDVHG´UHVWULFWLRQVRUSHUPLVVLRQV
should be accepted: HJDQ³H[SHFWHGXVH´S- RQHWKDWLV³FRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKHFRQWH[WRIWKHLQWHUDFWLRQ´VKRXOG
EHDOORZHGZLWKRXWFRQVXPHUFRQVHQW,WLVKDUGWRVHHKRZWKLVJHOVZLWKWKHLUDGPLVVLRQWKDW³LWLVXQFOHDUZKR
would decide which additional uses are  benILFLDORUKDUPIXO´S 
173 Google has for example reputedly made this available to some UK universities implementing its Gmail services 
for free student and staff email. 
174 See discussion in A29 WP 196, Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud Computing ,  section 3 passim. For a general UK-
focused overview of cloud computing law, see  Christopher  Millard ed Cloud Computing Law  (OUP, 2013). 
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However, at the time of writing virtually all the legal routes to facilitate transfer of data to and 
from the Cloud (defined as potentially including storage outside the EU) are being challenged 
and imminently in crisis. The Art 29 Working Party, and the future draft GDPR  have taken an 
increasingly hard line on data exports from Europe since the Snowden revelations, with the A29 
WP arguing in particular that consent as an exemption  should not be relied on where transfers 
are recurrent, massive or structural175 The draft GDPR  may also in future restrict use of consent 
where ³tKHUHLVDVLJQLILFDQWLPEDODQFHEHWZHHQWKHSRVLWLRQ´RIWKHdata controller and the data 
VXEMHFW´176 and it seems likely this will also cause problems in some cloud computing contracts. 
Finally and most significantly , summing up the frost in the CJEU since the Snowden affair, the 
CJEU has recently declaUHG WKH HQWLUHW\ RI ³VDIH KDUERU´ LOOHJDO with a possible renegotiation 
now hard to see and future challenges likely also to Binding Corporate Rules (BCRs), model 
contractual clauses and other methods of legitimising data transfers to the US177. 
 
It is not at all easy to predict how the Cloud, or the law, will adapt themselves now ³VDIHKDUERU´
has been struck down. The decision may in fact be seen as more symbolic than anything else, 
given the relatively small number of US companies enrolled in safe harbor, and the large amount 
of data transfers out of the EU in fact facilitated by model contracts and other informal and more 
flexible arrangements (around 50% according to one estimate). One aspiring solution for 
European smart cities may be to  help build and use a Europe-only cloud (also referred to as a 
³6FKHQJHQ FORXG´ 178 'HXWVFKH 7HOHNRP $* *HUPDQ\¶V ELJJHVW WHOHFRPs provider, has 
apparently already started to implement such.179  
 
(iv) Interim conclusions 
 
,W LV VWULNLQJKRZGHVSLWHD ORQJSHULRGRI VRFLHWDOEHPRDQLQJRI WKH³GHDWKRISULYDF\´ LQ WKH
digital networked era, the principal privacy institutions of both the EU and US, aided by an 
increasingly aggressive CJEU,  are nonetheless very determined to assert that the so-called 
corpse, or at least the DP version of it,  is in fact alive and well.  The reaction of the A29 WP 
quoted above is typical RI(XURSH¶VZDWFKGRJERG\: DP is still fit for purpose  and in principle 
does not need modified, though the detail may need some fine honing to deal with threats such as 
the increasing marginalisation of informed consent, big data, the IoT and the Cloud7KH)7&¶V
reaction is surprisingly similar: faced with the enumerated issues of IoT above, and even without 
the cultural foundation of an omnibus privacy law founded in human rights to depend on, they 
VWLOO DVVHUW ³protecting privacy and enabling innovation are not mutually exclusive and must 
consider principles of accountability and privacy by design´180.  
 
But other voices from industry, security and policy grumble loudly beside them ; the UK as a 
business-friendly outlier in the privacy culture of Europe has been one of the principle voices 
                                                          
175 See A29 WP Working Document 12/1998: Transfers of personal data to third countries: Applying Articles 25 
and 26 of the EU data protection directive, pp. 27-28. See also A29 WP, Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud Computing  WP 
196. para 3.5.2., p. 18. 
176 Article 7(4) of draft GDRP as per European Parliament.  It remains uncertain if this provision will survive 
trilogue. See Paul Schwartz, ³EU Privacy and the Cloud: Consent and Jurisdiction Under the Proposed Regulation´ 
SafeGov (May 13 2013), at http://safegov.org/2013/5/13/eu-privacy-and-the-cloud-consent-and-jurisdiction-under-
the-proposed-regulation . 
177 See Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner of Ireland, Judgment, Case C-362/14, 6 October 2015. 
178 See W. K. Hon, C. Millard, C. Reed, J. Singh, I. Walden, and J. Crowcroft, ³Policy, Legal and Regulatory 
Implications of a Europe-Only Cloud´ SSRN (November 21 2014), pp. 2-3, at 
http://www.picse.eu/sites/default/files/PolicyLegalandRegulatoryImplicationsof%20EuropeOnlyCloud.pdf . 
179 See Nicole Henderson, ³With Plans to Double Business Cloud Revenue by 2018, Deutsche Telekom Extends 
Huawei Partnership´ (June 15 2015), at http://www.thewhir.com/web-hosting-news/with-plans-to-double-business-
cloud-revenue-by-2018-deutsche-telekom-extends-huawei-partnership . 
180 FTC, supra n 65 at 39. 
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pressing for a PRUH³risk-based´ application of DP law which has potentially found its way into 
various parts of the GDPR181 ; and enforcement, rather than the principles themselves, remains 
the key failure point of DP law, even more so when taking account the effective landgrab by the 
EU over data processing by non EU companies working in EU markets ushered in by the Google 
Spain182 case. -XVW DV GHFODULQJ ³VDIH KDUERU´ YRLG ZLOO QRW LQ SUDFWLFH VWRS GDWD IORZLQJ WR
Google, Facebook, Amazon et al, merely make it it a bit more difficult, so privacy in smart cities 
can also not be safeguarded by ever more exhortations to respect the law, particularly as that law 
becomes ever more baroquely complex and subtle to interpret183. In this writer¶V RSLnion, 
solutions in natural surveillance architectures such as smart cities must be built into the code  of 
these cities ± not just their software and hardware but their material design. This is the principle 
RI³SULYDF\E\GHVLJQ´DQGLn the final section, I examine this both in abstract, and with some 
concrete examples of solutions proposed by data scientists and human: computer interaction 
(HCI) specialists. 
 
VI. Solutions? 
 
(i) Privacy by Design and Privacy Impact Assessments 
 
Privacy by design (PbD) is an approach to protecting privacy by embedding it into the design 
specifications of technologies, business practices, and physical infrastructures184. PbD solutions 
(to pick a few that are particularly relevant to smart cities)  include:  restricting the amount of 
data applications collect to the minimum; encrypting data flows as default; anonymising personal 
data (see earlier comments on difficulties thereof); embedding privacy notices systems in user-
friendly ways at appropriate times UHVWULFWLQJ WKH UHWHQWLRQ SHULRGV RI GDWD ³GDWD H[SLU\´
providing menus of privacy settings which are in clear language and user friendly, and where 
defaults are particularly protective of children XVLQJ ³IODVK FDUGV´ WR PDNH V\VWHP GHVLJQHUV
think about privacy issues as they build their systems185.   
 
PbD, which builds holistically on the older notion of Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) 
KDVDOUHDG\EHHQDSSOLHG WR WKHELJGDWD LVVXH WRSURGXFHVXJJHVWLRQV IRU³%LJ3ULYDF\´186 but 
there is little sign of it in the IoT debates to date (see issues examined above). The most radical 
solution via PbD to the problems around the  IoT might be to argue that data collected by devices 
be held locally (and as far as possible processed locally) and thus maintained under the control of 
the user, rather than gifted to data controllers, in the Cloud or otherwise. This solution, 
VRPHWLPHV NQRZQ LQ WKH FRPSXWHU VFLHQFH ZRUOG DV ³SHUVRQDO GDWD FRQWDLQHUV´ LV UHFHLYLQJ D
great deal of attention from researchers187. While detailed critique is beyond the scope of this 
article, such solutions raise their own problems of security and comprehensibility to (and hence 
control by) average users in the current state of development. Hildebrandt and Koops go further 
                                                          
181 Of course as the A29 WP themselves remind us, the DPD has always had some elements of risk assessment eg 
the different protection accorded ordinary and sensitive personal data. However their resistance to the idea in 
relation to big data and a move from restrcitions on collection to restrcitions on use is patent. See WP 218  Statement 
on  the role of a risk-based approach in data protection legal frameworks , 30 May 2014. 
182 Supra n 127. Also see now Case C-230/14 Weltimmo s.r.o. v Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság 
Hatóság, Judgment, 1 October 2015. 
183 Or as Neil Brown put it on Twitter post Schrems³/DZGRHVQ¶WSURWHFWGDWD² it just nudges behaviour. I use 
maths to encrypt my disk, not wrap it in a copy of directive 95/46/EC´#QHLOBQHLO]RQH2FWREHU 
184 See https://www.privacybydesign.ca/ . 
185 See Ewa Luger, Lachlan Urquhart, Tom 5RGGHQDQG0*ROHPEHZVNL³3OD\LQJWKH/HJDO&DUG8VLQJ,GHDWLRQ
&DUGVWR5DLVH'DWD3URWHFWLRQ,VVXHVZLWKLQWKH'HVLJQ3URFHVV´Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human 
Factors in Computing Systems (CHI 15), Seoul, 18-23 April 2014. 
186 See Anne Cavoukian and Drummond Reed  Big Privacy: Bridging Big data and the Personal data Ecosystem 
Through Privacy by Design, 2013,  at https://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/pbd-big_privacy.pdf . 
187 See eg 0DOWH6FKZDU]NRSIHWDO³3HUVRQDO&RQWDLQHUV<XUWVIRU'LJLWDO1RPDGV´DW
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~avsm2/perscon-d1.pdf . 
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and argue that where processing is controlled locally in devices, code constraints can be built in 
which reify the rules of law protecting users, a concept they name ³DPELHQW LQWHOOLJHQFH´188. 
However Koops and Leenes have also expressed doubts as to the practicality of architecture 
HPEHGGLQJ'3UXOHVDUJXLQJWKDWHQFRGLQJSULYDF\SURYLVLRQVLQODZLV³far from trivial´PRVW
REYLRXVO\ EHFDXVH RI WKH ³flexible´ LH RSHQ WH[WXUHG  SKUDVLQJ RI PRVW ODZV LQ WKH DUHD DQG
EHFDXVHRIWKHODFNRID³privacy mindset´LQ,7V\VWHPGHVLJQHUV189. 
 
As  faith in legal privacy solutions has ebbed in the globalised information world, PbD solutions 
have arguably been given more and more visibility by policymakers and privacy regulators as 
well as academics. However in 2014, ENISA still reported WKDW ³privacy and data protection 
features are, on the whole, ignored by traditional engineering approaches when implementing 
the desired functionality. This ignorance is caused and supported by limitations of awareness 
and understanding of developers and data controllers as well as lacking tools to realise privacy 
by design. While the research community is very active and growing, and constantly improving 
existing and contributing further building blocks, it is only loosely interlinked with practice´190  
For most companies, the motivations to code actively to protect privacy rather than to track data, 
remain few191. 
 
Recent empirical work by Irit, Hadar et al in which software engineers were interviewed in a 
number of employment settings,  about their privacy coding practices, comes to similar 
conclusions192. They note that the engineering mindset often restricts the vocabulary used around 
privacy, and hence the action taken,  to ³VHFXULW\´LQWKHVHQVHRIWKLUGSDUW\WKUHDWVsection III 
above) rather than a wider view embracing ideas like consent  and purpose limitation. 14 out of 
27 engineers in the interview sample  had no knowledge of privacy law, and only 4 could 
reference specific privacy laws. The organisational culture of commercial companies where 
some engineers worked, though giving lip service to privacy policies, actually largely ignored or 
discouraged consideration of PbD. Interestingly, the team also found considerable evidence that 
FRGHUVGLGQRWZDQWWR³WDNHUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUSULYDF\´3ULYDF\ZDVDVRFLDORUPRUDOLVVXHDQG
their domain was technology and engineering193.  7KH SDSHU FRQFOXGHV  ³Privacy by design? 
:HOOQRWMXVW\HW«LI3E'LVHYHUWREHFRPHDYLDEOHSUDFWLFHa considerable change [needs] to 
EHPDGH´ 
 
Despite these forbodings of futility, PbD will soon probably be mandated by law in the 
EU. A legal commitment to PbD LQFOXGLQJ³SULYDF\E\GHIDXOW´in the draft GDPR has 
been loosely agreed by all parties in the process, but has remained throughout  
maddeningly vague.194 Recital 61 of the European Parliament pre-trilogue draft of the 
*'35 DVVHUWHG WKDW  ³the principle of data protection by design requires that data 
protection be embedded within the entire life cycle of the technology, from the very early 
stage, right through to its ultimate deployment, use and final disposal.´How ordinary 
                                                          
188 See eg Mireille Hildebrandt and Bert--DDS.RRSV³7Ke Challenges of Ambient Law and Legal Protection in the 
3URILOLQJ(UD´ 2010 73(3) Modern Law Review 428. 
189 Bert--DDS.RRSVDQG5RQDOG/HHQHV³3ULYDF\5HJXODWLRQ&DQQRW%H+DUGFRGHG$&ULWLFDO&RPPHQWRQWKH
'Privacy by Design' Provision in Data-Protection /DZ´,QWHUQDWLRQDO5HYLHZRI/DZ&RPSXWHUV	
Technology 159 
190 G Danezis et al Privacy and Data Protection by Design ± from Policy to Engineering (ENISA: Heraklion 2014) p 
iv. 
191 Koops and Leenes, supra n.188. 
192 ³$UH'HVLJQHUV5HDG\IRUPrivacy by Design? Examining Perceptions of Privacy Among Information Systems 
'HVLJQHUV"´735&&RQIHUHQFH3DSHUDEVWUDFWDW 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2413498. The authors kindly shared a draft with this writer. 
193 This writer has observed herself at multidisciplinary events that lawyers frequently look to technologists for 
privacy solutions while technologists do the exact opposite ± a sort of regulator\³SDVVWKHSDUFHO´. 
194 Some guidance has been provided by the A29 WP for the IoT : supra n 119 at Section 7.1 
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engineers and coders, without substantive training or awareness of privacy in any detail, 
often working in small IoT or cloud businesses which are not customer-facing, and 
tasked to focus on speed and cheapness,  will implement this holy grail in smart city 
applications, poses a very large problem for the future. 
 
Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs) are one approach to making PbD more viable and 
effective.  They are also mandated by the drDIW *'35 DV ³GDWD SURWHFWLRQ LPSDFW
DVVHVVPHQWV´ WKRXJK RQO\ LQ SDUWLFXODU FLUFXPVWDQFHV RI QRYHO RU LQKHUHQWO\ ULVN\
processing195.  7KH ,&2¶V &RGHRIpractice on conducting privacy impact assessments 
GHILQHV D3,$DV ³a process which assists organisations in identifying and minimising 
the privacy risks of new projects or policies´196 PIAs are now fairly widely used around 
the world by stakeholders in novel or sensitive areas such as medical or genetic 
technologies, to define and foresee privacy threats in order to develop solutions at the 
early stages of projects or programmes.197 The outstanding example of thinking about 
applying PIAs systematically to an early IoT technology can be found in the work of 
Spiekerman and her team on the EU framework for a PIA for RFID chips198 and the A29 
WP has already recommended adapting the RFID framework to map threats in smart 
cities199. This framework has since been refined further to create the Data Protection 
Impact Assessment (DPIA) Template for Smart Grid and Smart Metering systems200. 
 
Spiekerman¶VDVVHVVPHQWRIWKHVWUHQJWKRIWKH5),'3,$OLHVLQLWVDWWHPSWWRFRQWUROD
serious treat to privacy ± data collection via the IoT ± WKURXJKD ³UHODWLYHO\ FRPSOHWH
KROLVWLFDQGSURDFWLYHWDFNOLQJRIWKHSUREOHP´6KHDOVRSURPRWHVLWVFR-production with 
industry, its global acceptability and the flexibility of the solutions arrived at which 
could be adapted to particular industry sectors or technologies. Her doubts are however 
interesting.  6KHDGPLWV WKDWFUHDWLQJWKH5),'3,$ZDVPHUHO\WKH³SURRIRIFRQFHSW´
SKDVHDQGWKDWFRPSDQLHVZRXOGKDYHWREH³UHDOly willing to comply with the rules that 
WKH\KDYHVHWIRUWKHPVHOYHV´7KLVLVLQIDFWH[DFWO\ZKDW Irit, Hadar et al found not to 
be the case and the anecdotally slow uptake on the RFID PIA seems to back this up. 
Another issue was uncertainty as to whose responsibility it was to kick off a PIA, and 
whether existing RFID implementations should be included in the PIA scheme (answer: 
QRXQOHVVWKHUHZHUH³VLJQLILFDQWFKDQJHV´LQWKHDSSOLFDWLRQVXFKDVH[SDQGLQJEH\RQG
original purposes) . The biggest question of all was sanctions. How would companies 
suffer if they did not undertake such a PIA, or gain if they did? This uncertainty will 
                                                          
195 6HHGLVFXVVLRQLQ5ROI:HEHU³3ULYDF\PDQDJHPHQWSUDFWLFHVLQWKHSURSRVHG(8UHJXODWLRQ´,QWHUQDWLRQDO'DWD
Privacy Law (2014) 4 (4): 290-297. 
196 ICO, Conducting privacy impact assessments code of practice, Version: 1.0 (February 2014), p. 5, at 
https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1595/pia-code-of-practice.pdf  
197 See Center of Excellence for Information Sharing, ³+RZ'R:H,GHQWLI\DQG$VVHVV5LVNVWR3ULYDF\"´ available 
at http://informationsharing.org.uk/our-work/tools/scoping/how-does-the-partnership-assess-the-risks-and-benefits-
of-the-information-sharing/how-do-we-identify-and-assess-risks-to-privacy/. See generally  Wright and deHert eds 
at n 84 supra.  
198 Supra n 84. The final document produced is available at A29 WP, Privacy and Data Protection Impact 
Assessment Framework for RFID Applications (January 12, 2011), available at 
http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/enet/documents/rfid-pia-framework-final.pdf . It is however non-mandatory and 
XSWDNHKDVUHSRUWHGO\EHHQORZVHH³7KH6RFLHWDO,PSDFWRI WKH,QWHUQHWRI7KLQJV´UHSRUWRIZRUNVKRSRQWKH
Internet of Thing organized by BCS, the Chartered Institute for IT, on 14 February 2013, pp. 11-12, at 
http://www.bcs.org/upload/pdf/societal-impact-report-feb13.pdf . 
199 See A29 (2014), supra note 119, at p. 21 . 
200 See Smart Grid Task Force 2012-14, Expert Group 2: Regulatory Recommendations for Privacy, Data Protection 
and Cyber-Security in the Smart Grid Environment, Data Protection Impact Assessment Template for Smart Grid 
and Smart  Metering systems (March 18, 2014), p. 5, at 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/2014_dpia_smart_grids_forces.pdf . 
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remain even if the GDPR passes in its current form given the vagueness of the criteria 
for when a DPIA is required. 
 
Can a PIA usefully be carried out for a smart city as an entity? This is unlikely to happen 
ab initio in the Western world model of retrofitted smart cities, where ubiquitous 
computing acquires traction by slow aggregation (though Spiekerman would almost 
FHUWDLQO\ VD\VXFKDGGLWLRQV IRUPD³VLJQLILFDQW FKDQJH´  ± but if we look to a future 
where smart cities (or new sections of them) are routinely built top down, as in India and 
Korea, then the challenge is both more likely. Greenfield and brownfield development 
schemes in the UK are already routinely preceded by impact assessments of various 
kinds eg relating to population, traffic flows etc,  and these seem broadly successful 
despite the complexities.  Traditional PIAs however assume an ability to map data 
inputs, flows,  and outputs, identify the ³owners´ FRQWUROOHUV of the data and bring 
these stakeholders together to make decisions, ideally with one person at the top of the 
decision-making hierarchy. In a smart city, as we have seen,  there will be hugely 
multiple interacting data flows, multiple data owners/controllers and different 
jurisdictions of storage and processing, with all of these varying over time and creating 
feedback loops with each other. The city mayor or municipal government may well feel 
they have the power and duty to control the final design ± but actual (though perhaps not 
legal) control may rest with private vendors or investors and their sub and sub-sub-
SURYLGHUV LQ WKH &ORXG )XWXUH FLWLHV PD\ HYHQ KDYH ³DGDSWLYH DUFKLWHFWXUHV´ ZKLFK
begin to decide themselves what data to collect and how to process it201.  Algorithms 
will be opaque and change as they learn in ways such that even data controllers may 
have little idea what exactly is happening in their data silos and conduits. In this 
³Kafkaesque machinery that manipulates lives based on opaque justifications´202 we 
will need to think very hard about how to get PIAs useful. This will be as much a job for 
urban planners, engineers and architects (among others) as privacy experts. 
 
Notwithstanding it would be good to see a research effort begin to think about how a 
PIA might start to map potential risks, and explore PbD solutions in a dedicated way for 
smart cities203. A role for co-ordination and standardisation here (important for global 
impact204) might fall to a number of bodies including the BSI and ISO205 authorities. 
PIAs are also ripe for expansion to explicitly investigate a number of other fundamental 
human rights or eithical areas problematic in smart cities. For example, as briefly 
mentioned above, big data profiling has serious implications for discrimination practices, 
due process (eg, evidence used to construct crimes) and freedom of speech (eg when 
public social media are data mined). A holistic PIA ± a precautionary but also enabling 
IUDPHZRUNIRU³HWKLFVE\GHVLJQ´206 ± would be a magnificent obsession indeed. 
                                                          
201 Holger Schnädelbach ³Smart Cities: The Built Environment as the Interface to Personal Data´ in SCL special 
edition, supra n 1. 
202 7DNHQIURP2PDU7HQHDQG-XOHV3RORQHWVN\³%LJGDWDIRU$OO: Privacy and User Control in the Age of 
$QDO\WLFV´1Z-7HFKDQG,QWHOO3URSDW 
203 An interesting US contribution from Michael Froomkin suggests a model taken from environmental impact 
assessments to regulate mass surveillance in urban areas6HH³5HJXODWLQJ0DVV6XUYHLOODQFHDV3ULYDF\3ROOXWLRQ
/HDUQLQJIURP(QYLURQPHQWDO,PSDFW6WDWHPHQWV´GUDIWDYDLODEOHDW6651ODVWUHYLVHG1RYDW
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2400736 . 
204 ,WVKRXOGEHQRWHGRIFRXUVHWKDWWKHUHDUHVWLOOFRQVLGHUDEOHGLVVHQWHUVIURPWKHYDOXHRI³SULRUZDUQLQJ´
DSSURDFKHVVXFKDV3,$VDWDOOVHHHJ$GDP7KLHUHUFKDPSLRQLQJWKHYDOXHRI³SHUPLVVLRQOHVVLQQRYDWLRQ´RYHr 
WKH³SUHFDXWLRQDU\SULQFLSOH´VHH7KLHUHU³7KH,QWHUQHWRI7KLQJVDQG:HDUDEOH7HFKQRORJ\ 
$GGUHVVLQJ3ULYDF\DQG6HFXULW\&RQFHUQVZLWKRXW'HUDLOLQJ,QQRYDWLRQ´5LFKPRQG-QORI/DZDQG
Technology 1 at http://jolt.richmond.edu/v21i2/article6.pdf.  
205 See BSI work on standards in smart cities at http://www.bsigroup.com/en-GB/smart-cities/Smart-Cities-
Standards-and-Publication/ . For ISO contribution, see n 17 supra. 
206 See some foreshadowing of this in work to be commissioned at n 103 above. 
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(ii) Applying PbD more specifically to smart cities 
 
In this section I want to focus closely on  one problem, that of obtaining informed 
consent in IoT environments. Consent is important because, while not the only 
legitimate ground for processing in EU DP law, it is the most global standard of 
legitimacy (given the US non-mandatory concept of notice and choice), and most likely 
to engender user trust. Where sensitive data is collected furthermore, eg health data, in 
the EU scheme explicit consent will generally be required. As noted above, getting 
meaningful consent in IoT environments is a hard problem. If PbD can aid us here, it has 
a fighting chance of helping elsewhere. Consent is also an area where a cross 
disciplinary literature related to the IoT has begun to accumulate from computer science, 
security, HCI, ethics, medicine and psychology as well as law. 
 
Various approaches have already been canvassed by researchers, usually in a rather 
aspirational way.  Traditionally, consent is given at the time that data is collected. The 
FTC and others have came up with a number of existing good practice approaches to 
obtaining such consent207 in a world of multiple tiny devices with no user interfaces, 
designed to be as unobtrusive as possible.  We can catalogue this sort of approach as not 
deconstructing traditioQDO³QRWLFHDQGFKRLFH´EXWFODULI\LQJWKHFKRLFHV, or  boosting the 
notice, to meet the constraints of IoT. 
 
Improved traditional ³QRWLFHDQGFKRLFH´ 
 
These strategies include : 
(i) directing customers to video tutorials to guide them through privacy settings 
pages GUDZQIURP)DFHERRNRUDOWHUQDWHO\SURYLGLQJ³VHWXS´ZL]DUGVWRJHW
data collection choices right208;  
(ii) KRPHV RU RWKHU ORFDWLRQV PLJKW KDYH GHWDLOHG FRQWURO ³GDVKERDUGV´ RU
³PDQDJHPHQWSRUWDOV´ZKere consumers could review with some clarity what 
data they had chosen to share from time to time across different applications 
or via different devices; 
(iii) putting QR codes on IoT devices, which could be scanned by customers 
using their smartphones, to give them easy access to privacy policies or other 
advice; 
(iv) providing icons to convey privacy-related information, such as a flashing 
light that appears when an IoT device connects to the Internet; different icons 
might flash up to show different levels of risk, and/or different types of data 
collection. 
(v) CustRPHUV PLJKW DVN ³MXVW LQ WLPH´ IRU privacy and security settings to be 
sent to them via emails or texts  
 
None of these seem to get us much further in the context of smart cities, especially in 
busy public settings such as smart transport networks. Will users really stop to retrieve, 
read and consider privacy policies on their phones, even shortened ones, even if acquired 
via QR codes, while trying to catch a smart tram or hail an autonomous car/taxi or buy a 
pizza from a passing drone? Most non-IoT research on consent and privacy policies says 
                                                          
207 See FTC , 2015, supra n 65, at pp. v and 41-42. 
208 In the IoT, unlike on Facebook, these menus or tutorials would presumably have to be navigated via another 
connected device the user has access to which does have a screen eg smartphone. This is clumsy to say the least. 
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not, and the problems only get worse in the IoT209.  Icons may be more easily grasped, 
and thus of more use: but also raise large issues of recognisability, confusion, global 
standardisation and interoperability: to date, no single framework for privacy icons has 
emerged nor has any of the very many aspiring schemes of privacy icons caught on as a 
global standard, or even been much used210.  
 
The key problem remains as already discussed, that even if methods can be found for 
giving some kind of notice/information, the consents obtained in the IoT are almost 
always going to be be illusory or at best low-quality in terms of the EU legal demand for 
freely given, specific and informed consent.211 If use of smart devices becomes 
unavoidable in a smart city, then  ³QRWLFHDQGFKRLFH´simply becomes an inapplicable 
paradigm. 
 
³3UH-FRQVHQW´" 
 
An alternate approach which might look more promising, is to reconsider how consent 
might be given in the IoT world, conceiving it as an ongoing process, rather than a one-
time choice at the point of data collection212.  We have some precedent for this in the 
offline world in the form of advance ³RSW-RXW´ SUHIHUHQFH V\VWHPV VXFK DV WKH 8. 
Telephone Preferences Service213, where a user can say they do not wish to receive junk 
mail or be cold-called at any time in the future. Online, attempts to transfer this model to 
the placement of cookies by ZHEVLWHVLQWKHIRUPRI³GRQRWWUDFN´(DNT) systems have 
so far been resounding failures, with attempts to negotiate between browser 
manufacturers, websites, and policymakers from EU and US ending in abject collapse214.  
7KH'17ILDVFRVKRZHGXSDQXPEHURISUREOHPVILUVWGRHV³GRQRW WUDFNPH´PHDQ
³GRQRWFROOHFWP\GDWD´RUPHUHO\³GRQRWXVHP\GDWDWRVHQGPHtargeted adverts, but 
FROOHFWLWDQ\ZD\"´VHFRQGLQDVHOIUHJXODWRU\V\VWHPKRZFDQZHEVLWHVEHFRPSHOOHd 
to obey the DNT tag; third, how can the user know if there is compliance or not, given 
the information assymetry?  The second problem in particular persists even if one 
                                                          
209 6HHHJ$00F'RQDOG/)&UDQRU³7KH&RVWRI 5HDGLQJ3ULYDF\3ROLFLHV´-RXUQDORI/DZDQG3ROLF\
for the Information Society 540. The Ofcom commissioned report Personal data and Privacy , supra n 101, Annex 
at p 64, considered that existing problems with non-reading of privacy policies would only be exacerbated by the 
IoT, especially given more and more devices would become connected, demanding more and more complicated 
privacy policiesto be read. Furthermore, reading a privacy policy might take longer than the actual length of 
interaction with the IoT device, reducing further incentive to read. Information assymetruies would also be increased 
LQWKH,R7³consumers will be very likely to lose any ability to assess possibilities for data uses in the IoT´DJDLQ
rendering privacy policies fairly useless. 
210 See survey in Lilian Edwards and Wiebke Abel The Use of Privacy Icons and Standard Contract Terms for 
Generating Consumer Trust and Confidence in Digital Services, CREATe Working Paper 2014/15, at 
http://www.create.ac.uk/blog/2014/10/31/create-working-paper-201415-the-use-of-privacy-icons-and-standard-
contract-terms-for-generating-consumer-trust-and-confidence-in-digital-services/ Successful examples of the use of 
LFRQVWRSURYLGHFRQVXPHULQIRUPDWLRQGRH[LVW³RII-OLQH´HJHQHUJ\XVHE\DSSOLFDWLRQVODXQGU\LQVWUXFWLRQVDQG
nutritional labelling; and  in  the digital  world, such  as  the  use  of Creative  Commons icons 
to  indicate  the  permissions given by the creator of a copyright work. The best known online privacy icons set 
(PIS) is probably that sponsored by Mozilla and found at https://disconnect.me/icons . It is possible the GDPR may 
mandate privacy icons as graphic representations of privacy policies  which may hasten standardisation. 
211 See text at n 124 above, and below. 
212  2UXVHVHHEHORZ6HHIXUWKHU(ZD/XJHUDQG7RP5RGGHQ³$QLQIRUPHGYLHZRQFRQVHQWIRU8EL&RPS´
Proceedings UbiComp '13 , Proceedings of the 2013 ACM international joint conference on Pervasive and 
ubiquitous computing, pp 529-538 ACM, New York.  
213 http://www.tpsonline.org.uk/tps/index.html . While a self regulatory initiative, this system is backed by EU and 
UK law, giving it enforcement teeth via the ICO. DNT systems, as created by W3C and browser writers, do not 
benefit from this. 
214 6HHF\QLFDOO\³:&
VIDLOHG'R1RW7UDFNFUXVDGHWXPEOHVWRDG-EORFNHUV
9LHWQDP´The Register ,29 Jul 2015 
at http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/07/29/dnt_dead_in_the_water/ . 
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regime (eg the EU) legislates to require DNT as mandatory, but another (eg the US) does 
not. A number of commentators have proposed in effect extending the DNT model to the 
IoTQRWDEO\:HEHUZLWKKLVFDOOIRUDULJKWWRD³VLOHQFHRIWKHFKLSV215´± but none have 
so far made a workable suggestion in a global environment. 
 
From HCI literature (and as far as this writer knows, not yet absorbed into the legal 
lexicon) comes another suggestion decoupling the time of  giving consent from the time 
of collection of data, ZKLFKLVWKDWRI³sticky privacy preferences´7KHLGHDKHUHLVWKDW
the privacy choices you made earlier are remembered by smart systems, and applied the 
next time a choice needs to be made. The FTC suggest that a single device in a smart 
home ± a home appliance that acts as a hub ± could learn a cRQVXPHU¶V SUHIHUHnces 
based on prior behaviour and apply them to new appliances and new uses. This has some 
promise: psychologically, behaviour is often consistent, and such systems could use big 
data profiling over time for good not evil. But even the early primitive examples we 
have of smart machine learning in homes, eg, the NEST thermostat, which learns how 
users like their home heated at different hours, show problems with the outcomes: users 
complain, eg, that the house is heated how they like , yes, but it costs them more than in 
the old days when explicit choices had to be made about when to turn the heating up. It 
might be better to skip this stage and move on to fully fledged programmable software 
DJHQWVZKLFKZHFDQXVHWRPDNH³semi-autonomous´Fhoices for us about our privacy in 
ambient environments216. This idea is gaining some currency in computing science 
research circles217 but as yet has not proved itself in the wild. To a lawyer as opposed to 
a data scientist, it seems unlikely that the difficult personal, ethical, social and financial 
choices involved in collection and use of personal data, not to mention the problem of 
changing contexts,  can be reliably modelled by pre-coded agents, even ones that learn 
as time progresses218 ± but the approach is in theory at least a little hopeful. 
 
Moving away from notice and consent entirely 
 
Many European commentators are moving towards the notion that notice and choice, or 
consent as a ground for legitimising processing, is simply broken. Users, as has been 
proven over and over again, have neither the resources, opportunity, inclination, or 
motivation to give meaningful consents219 in the current online environment and this is 
only exacerbated by the IoT220; yet their individual chimeric choices are allowed to 
rubberstamp patterns of data collection which are increasingly damaging for society. 
Simulataneously, on the other side of the Atlantic, some writers are also arguing that 
responsibility for ensuring ethical and responsible data collection should be on the data 
collectors, not the hapless users. In this case, though, the acknowledgement often comes 
                                                          
215 See further Rolf Weber and Romana Weber, Internet of Things: Legal Perspectives (Springer, 2010) at 39. See 
DOVR$:3,R7QDWVXJJHVWLQJWKDW,R7GHYLFHVPXVWRIIHUD³GRQRWFROOHFW´RSWLRQWRVXEVFribers. This 
would not prevent the data of third parties being collected however. 
216 6HHHJ*RPHUVKUDHIHODQG*HUGLQJ³&RQVHQWLQJDJHQWVVHPL-DXWRQRPRXVLQWHUDFWLRQVIRUXELTXLWRXVFRQVHQW´
Proceeding UbiComp '14 Adjunct Proceedings of the 2014 ACM International Joint Conference on Pervasive and 
Ubiquitous Computing: Adjunct Publication, pp 653-658, ACM New York at 
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2638728.2641682 . 
217 And, very recently, in law and IT circles : see eg Polonetsky who proposes obtaining consent in advance through 
profile management portals that would allow consumers to determine what information they agree to share. See 
Jules Polonetsky, Comments of the Future of Privacy Forum on Connected Smart Technologies in advance of the 
)7&³,QWHUQHWRI7KLQJV´:RUNVKRS-XO\ 
218 And one wonders, how easy would such agents be to hack? Would our privacy agents need DRM, or anti virus 
protection?j 
219 See the interesting interdisciplinary project on Meaningful Consent in the Digital Economy at 
http://www.meaningfulconsent.org/ . 
220 See n 207 supra. 
 34 
 
with a catch: the transfer of legal or ethical safeguards to the time of use of the data not 
its collection, with safeguards (if any) varying according to use221. As already noted 
above222, this could be the kind of loophole, well meant or otherwise, which might 
actually spell the final death of data protection.  
 
Ethical constraints on data collectors, regardless of whether or not users give 
meaningless consents, are being promoted as a new approach. It is not uncommon for 
professionals such as doctors, lawyers, even architects, engineers or electricans to be 
held to a higher level of conduct than the basic law demands, by professional codes, BSI 
standards or organisational seals. Such ³soft law´ guarantees are often seen as effective 
in competitive consumer-facing markets where good behaviour can attract business. 
However the data collection markets to date are famously not competitive in this sense, 
as  a result of information asymetries plus network effects. Can ethical standards be 
presented as a selling point to users or industry? The EDPS seems to think so: his latest 
opinion at time of writing223 UHFRPPHQGV D ³QHZ GLJLWDO HWKLFV´ IRU ³DFFRXQWDEOH 
FRQWUROOHUV´LQZKLFKHPSRZHUHGSURVXPHUVZLOOEHDEOHWRGLVFORVHGDWDZLWKRXWIHDULQJ
the ORVV RI WKHLU ³GLJQLW\´ 6XFK LGHDV  have appeal within academic research 
communities, and may offer help in sensitive public sector services such as health, as 
well as in relation to new and potentially dangerous innovation224. But although there is 
some evidence from US cloud computing after Snowden, and panic reactions to security 
breaches, that industry will move to higher standards of care than the law requires where 
there has been a crippling loss of trust225, the lack of causality between the slow drip drip 
RI³RUGLQDU\´GDWDGLVFORVXUH DQGHYHQWXDOKDUPV WRXVHUVPHDQV WKHUH LVJHQHUDOO\QR
such Eureka moment where consumers lose all faith.  
 
So, finally biting an unwelcome bullet, the way forward may simply be to admit that 
consent is only a first step to lawful processing and that regardless of such permission, 
certain uses of that data, on the environmental model, are toxic and thus prohibited. In 
other words, to make new law, QRWUHO\RQXQHQIRUFHDEOH³HWKLFV´2EYLRXVH[DPSOHVof 
possibly prohibited practices include targeting advertising to children, targeting alcohol, 
diets and drugs to addicts and anorexics, and making use of data gathered in inherently 
private places such as bathrooms.  But beyond this there is, of course, almost no 
consensus (and even these might be argued as a fair part of the free market by some US 
industry). Given the whittling away in the draft GDPR to date of even existing rights to 
object to automated decision making and profiling, we should not hold our breath 
waiting for, say, a globally respected regulated and enforceable code of conduct for 
certain data collecting sectors226. 
 
One distinct area where we might look for legal intervention, in particular in reference to 
the IoT, big data and smart cities, is the area of algorithmic transparency. Although I 
expressed uncertainty above that such transparency is actually available in the world of 
big data and learning algorithms, techniques for reverse engineering what is going on the 
³EODFNER[´ZLOOQRGRXEWLPSURYH227, and it is certainly one of the best potential tools 
                                                          
221 6HHHJ2EDPD¶VBig Data report, supra n 169 at 56 and  Cate, Cullen and Mayer-Schoenberger, supra n 170. 
222 P xx. 
223 EDPS Opinion 4/2015 Towards a New Digital Ethics (September, 2015) . 
224 See eg HC Science and Technology Committee Responsible Use of Data, 4th Report of 2014-15, 19 November 
2014. 
225 See  Ethical Code of Practice for Big Data Analysis (Hewlett Packard, 2015 ± shared privately with author); 
Digital Catapult Trust in Personal data: a UK Review (2015) at  http://www.digitalcatapultcentre.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/07/Trust-in-Personal-Data-A-UK-Review.pdf ; Tho cf Rosner, supra n 54. 
226 See second half of Edwards and Abel, supra n 208. 
227 Block chains may also offer opportunities for external audit and verification of algorithms. 
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for shining  a light on what  data profilers are actually up to. The little known right in the 
DPD of data subjecWV WR REWDLQ ³knowledge of the logic involved in any automatic 
processing of data concerning him´228 should be unambiguously retained and indeed 
explicitly extended to deal with all big data processing, and with some reasonable 
cutting down of the current hiding place provided by IP rights and trade secrets229. 
 
Science fiction 
 
How would we design the perfect future world which lets us, both individually and as a 
society, make the most of every positive feature of living in smart cities while 
maintaining our right to a private life? One tempting solution is found in Hannu 
Rajaniemi¶VThe Quantum Thief230. In Rajaniemi¶VIDUIXWXUHFLW\, people can choose to 
be invisible to all forms of data collection and tracking by assuming a technological 
VKLHOGNQRZQDVD³gevulot231´&HUWDLQSXEOLFVSDFHVLQWKHFLWLHVH[LVWZKHUHJHYXORWV
cannot be used so that accidental communion and public speech can still occur, but 
otherwise all interaction and data disclosure with other citizens is negotiated by the 
gevulot.  
 
³When two citizens randomly meet on the street their gevulot automatically 
exchanges privacy preferences and negotiates specific concessions. If someone 
does not want to be seen by you, then your gevulot will automatically blur/mute 
them out by interfacing with your visual cortex. If they wish to talk to you, then you 
will have to negotiate a gevulot contract which specifies whether this is going to 
be a public or private conversation, whether or not its contents can be shared with 
others, how much of it will be remembered by both parties, whether emotional 
reactions should be shared or if facial expressions and voice inflections should be 
algorithmically normalized.232´ 
 
,V WKLV ³WRWDO SULYDF\ VRFLHW\´ WKH ZRUOG ZH ZDQW WR OLYH LQ" /HDYLQJ WKDW DVLGH DV D
hanging question, some elements of this utopia/dystopia are already visibly in sight. 
There are moves towards DRM for personal data ± which might allow you to control 
who does what with your data - and to track its provenance wherever it goes233, even 
possibly where combined into profiles or pseudonymised. Joseph Lorenzo Hall of the 
&HQWUHIRU'HPRFUDF\DQG7HFKQRORJ\KDVVXJJHVWHGD³*HQHUDO3ULYDF\0HQX´ZKLFK
could allow consumers to control the amount and nature of data collected by IoT sensors 
and devices in sensitive locations, such as home and workplace, through development of 
a standard element to the networkable components of IoT objects.234 There is in general 
a great deal to anticipate in WKHHPHUJHQFHRIDQHZGLVFLSOLQHRI³+',´235, human-data 
                                                          
228 DPD, art 12(a). 
229 6HHUHFLWDODQGQRWHHYHQWKHFXUUHQWWH[WVD\V³these considerations must not, however, result in the data 
VXEMHFWEHLQJUHIXVHGDOOLQIRUPDWLRQ´. 
230 Gollancz, 2011. 
231 $SSDUHQWO\+HEUHZIRU³ERUGHUV´ 
232 $QH[FHOOHQWSDUDSKUDVHEHWWHUWKDQWKLVDXWKRUFRXOGPXVWHUIURP/XNH0DFLDN³7RWDO3ULYDF\6RFLHWLHVThe 
Quantum Thief by Hannu 5DMDQLHPL´$XJXVWDWhttp://www.terminally-
incoherent.com/blog/2011/08/10/total-privacy-societies-the-quantum-thief-by-hannu-rajaniemi/ . 
233 6HHHJ6LDQL3HDUVRQDQG0DUFR&0RQW³6WLFN\3ROLFLHV$Q$SSURDFKIRU0DQDJLQJ3ULYDF\DFURVV0XOWLSOH
3DUWLHV´,(((YRO,VVXH1R- Sep , pp60-68. 
234 See Joseph Lorenzo Hall, Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT), Comments for November 2013 
:RUNVKRS RQ WKH ³,QWHUQHW RI 7KLQJV´ -XQH   S  DW
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_comments/2013/07/00028-86211.pdf . 
235 6HH0RUWLHU5HWDO³+XPDQ-'DWD,QWHUDFWLRQWKH+XPDQ)DFHRIWKH'DWD'ULYHQ6RFLHW\´8QLYHUVLW\RI
Cambridge, 2014 at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2508051 . 
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interaction, which SURSRVHV³placing the human at the centre of the flows of data and 
providing mechanisms for citizens to interact with those systems and data explicitly´,W
LW D ORQJ ZD\ RII EXW WKH ³FRPSXWDWLRQDO WXUQ´236 which has so quickly impacted our 
privacy may turn again to give us tools with which it can be managed, both for our own 
purposes and for societal good. 
  
VII Conclusion  
 
The future of smart cities is important. They may offer solutions to some of our worst 
problems ± conserving energy and  creating a sustainable environment, maintaining 
public safety, engendering community, rescuing millennials from depression and 
loneliness, reducing road deaths. In cities with areas of mixed and multiple deprivation 
OLNH WKH ZULWHU¶V RZQ KRPH WRZQ *ODVJRZ their appeal is obvious and not to be 
rejected, even if a degree of cynicism on how much benefit  will accrue to vendors and 
municipal leaders rather than the residents is reasonable. But even within this context, 
privacy and security are important : if not simply as a fundamental right,  then 
instrumentally, as a prerequisite to keeping the trust and engagement of smart city 
dwellers. By now, as a society, we have a number of salutary stories of what happens 
when technology is perceived as dangerous and out of control, rationally or irrationally: 
HJWKHEDFNODVKDJDLQVW*0FURSVDQGWKHLUSURGXFWVWKHIHDURI³NLOOHUURERWV´DQGWKH
recent Scottish Government ban on fracking, self admittedly based not on evidence but 
on public disquiet237, all come to mind.  
 
In the privacy sphere, probably the most obvious recent defeat of innovation by privacy 
fears has been the rise and fall of the wearable Google Glass, with its users labelled 
Glassholes, banned from shops and public spaces and occasionally even attacked. If we 
lose faith in the physical architecture of our cities, homes and vehicles then the backlash 
may be much worse ± as perhaps seen in the current ouWUDJHDWWKHUHYHODWLRQVRI9:¶V
IDOVLILFDWLRQVRILWVGLHVHOFDUV¶HPLVVLRQVWHVWV We might see resistance to surveillance 
in smart cities, as we have seen resistance to CCTV by the young in the form of  
hoodies. If a significant number of users in smart cities refuse, say, to engage with 
services provided via  smart devices or environments , we may produce a new 
underclass of the digitally dispossessed or marginalised, unable perhaps to vote, claim 
welfare, or access medical services. These are all worrying futures we should try to 
avoid.  
 
This paper has tried to establish that while the political and economic drivers of smart 
cities tend towards technology supremacism, smart cities, at least in Europe,  will still 
suffer as a project if they fail to get privacy right; and that at the moment this failure is 
very likely, suffering as they do  from the combination of three of the most difficult 
issues for modern privacy law to regulate: the IoT, big data and Cloud based 
infrastructure. Even in the EU with its history of strong rights-based laws, DP solutions 
applicable to smart cities are so far generic and tenuous, and look to be getting further 
DZD\QRWQHDUHUHYHQDIWHUWKUHH\HDUVRIQHJRWLDWLRQVRQWKH*'35³&RGH´VROXWLRQV
may be more useful and should certainly be investigated to supplement the law. Four 
particular suggestions for further research and legislative and policy involvement are 
herein promoted: 
 
                                                          
236 See further Mireille Hildebrandt and de Vries eds Privacy and the Computational Turn (Routledge , 2013). 
237 6HH³613DQQRXQFHVLQGHILQLWHIUDFNLQJEDQLQ6FRWODQG³Telegraph, 28 January 2015, at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/earth/energy/fracking/11375332/SNP-announces-indefinite-fracking-ban-in-
Scotland.html . 
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(i) Investigation into the potential for a smart city PIA or DPIA; 
(ii) Investigation into the technical and social potential of methods of giving 
³SUH-FRQVHQW´ RU³VWLFN\FRQVHQW´to deal with the constraints of the IoT; 
(iii) Legislating for algorithmic transparency and researching ways of making 
algorithmic data comprehensible  to consumers; 
(iv) 0RYLQJ DW OHDVW SDUWLDOO\ DZD\ IURP FRQVHQW RU ³QRWLFH DQG FKRLFH´ DV D
main mechanism for validating data collection and processing; 
connectedly, prohibiting certain data processing activities (which?) even 
where there is consent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
